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ARTICLE

ADAPTING TO THE NEW SHAREHOLDER-CENTRIC
REALITY

EDWARD B. ROCK†
After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S.
corporate law—the separation of ownership and control—has mostly been brought
under control. This resolution has occurred more through changes in market and
corporate practices than through changes in the law. This Article explores how
corporate law and practice are adapting to the new shareholder-centric reality that
has emerged.
Because solving the shareholder–manager agency cost problem aggravates
shareholder–creditor agency costs, I focus on implications for creditors. After considering how debt contracts, compensation arrangements, and governance structures
can work together to limit shareholder–creditor agency costs, I turn to available
legal doctrines that can respond to opportunistic behavior that slips through the
cracks: fraudulent conveyance law, restrictions on distributions to shareholders, and
fiduciary duties. To sharpen the analysis, I analyze two controversies that pit
shareholders against creditors: a hypothetical failed LBO, and the attempts by
† Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Thanks to Isaac Corre, Assaf Hamdani, Ed Iacobucci, Reinier Kraakman, Marcel Kahan,
Mike Klausner, Travis Laster, Colin Mayer, Leo Strine, Lynn Stout, and George Triantis, and to
participants in workshops at the University of Chicago and the University of Pennsylvania, for
helpful conversations and comments. I have served as a consultant in a number of bankruptcy
cases involving directors’ creditor-regarding duties, including: In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141
(KJC), (Bankr. D. Del.) (on behalf of junior creditor’s proposed plan of reorganization); Weisfelner
v. Blavatnik, et al. (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.), Case No. 09-10023 (REG), Adv. No. 09-1375
(REG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (on behalf of the LB Litigation Trust); and In re Getty Petroleum
Marketing Inc., Case No. 11-15606 (SCC), Adv. No. 11-2941 (SCC), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (on behalf of
defendant directors).
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shareholders of Dynegy Inc. to divert value from creditors through the manipulation
of a complex group structure. I then consider some legal implications of a shareholder-centric system, including the importance of comparative corporate law, the
challenges to the development of fiduciary duties posed by the awkward divided
architecture of U.S. corporate law, the challenges for Delaware in adjudicating
shareholder–creditor disputes, and the potential value of reinvigorating the traditional “entity” conception of the corporation in orienting managers and directors.
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INTRODUCTION
Suppose that the central problem of U.S. corporate law for the last
eighty years—the separation of ownership and control—has largely been
solved. Suppose further that the solution came mostly through changes in
market and corporate practices rather than through changes in the law.

1910

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 1907

What should corporate law and practice focus on now? This Article opens a
discussion about how corporate law should adapt to the new shareholdercentric reality that has emerged over the last thirty years by focusing on the
implications for creditors.
Historically and comparatively, corporate law seeks to control three sorts
of agency costs: those between managers and dispersed shareholders,
between controlling and noncontrolling shareholders, and between shareholders and creditors. 1 Because the magnitude of these agency costs is
interrelated, changes in the severity of one sort of agency cost will affect the
severities of the others.2 In shareholder-centric corporate law systems like
the United Kingdom, creditor protection is a prominent feature. 3 By
contrast, in manager-centric corporate law systems, as in the United States
over much of the last eighty years, corporate law’s creditor-protection
features seem to atrophy. What happens when a system shifts from being
manager-centric to shareholder-centric? How can it adapt to the new reality
and respond to the increased need for creditor protection?
In this Article, I argue that, since the early 1980s, the U.S. system has
shifted from a manager-centric system to a shareholder-centric system. This
shift has occurred primarily through changes in managerial compensation,
shareholder concentration and activism, and board composition, outlook,
and ideology, rather than directly through legal change.4 With respect to the
most important decisions—such as changes in control—there is substantial
reason to believe that managers and directors today largely “think like
shareholders.”
If this is right—if we have evolved into a shareholder-centric system—
then the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem should return as a
central concern of corporate law. Further, to the extent that we have evolved
into a shareholder-centric system through changes in practice rather than
law, the law is unlikely to have kept pace. This Article analyzes how the
U.S. corporate law system has adapted to, and can continue to adapt to, this
new shareholder-centric reality and the shareholder–creditor agency costs
that accompany it. I do not argue for changes in the law per se, but I do
want to pose the question whether existing law is adequate to respond to the
different kinds of problems that emerge. As I describe below, we have a
variety of tools for responding to these changes: contracts, compensation,
1 REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 35 (2d ed. 2009).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 356-362.
4 This may partially explain why so few law professors seem to have noticed it.

2013]

The New Shareholder-Centric Reality

1911

governance arrangements, and legal doctrines (including fraudulent conveyance law, restrictions on distributions, and fiduciary duties).5
Do we have all the tools we need? Do we need to develop new tools? Do
we need to use existing tools in new ways? Reasonable minds can differ on
these important details, but what is clear, I think, is that we need to be alive
to the characteristic forms of shareholder–creditor opportunism so that we
can respond appropriately. In Part IV, after considering how contracts,
compensation, and governance arrangements can and do respond to these
challenges, I examine two controversies illustrating the kinds of behavior
that can slip through the basic web of protections and pose challenges: a
doomed leveraged buyout (LBO), and shareholder manipulation of complicated corporate subsidiary structures to divert value from creditors.
In a world in which managers’ high-powered equity incentives make
them think and act like shareholders, it is important to remind managers
and directors that the goal of the exercise is to create valuable firms, not to
maximize shareholder value as an end in itself. Focusing on creditors as a
group, despite the conflicts that exist among them, can be a useful proxy for
the wider social impact of maximizing shareholder value at the expense of
firm value.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE LAW SYSTEM:
THE WANING OF THE “SHAREHOLDER–MANAGER
AGENCY COST PROBLEM”
The separation of ownership and control has been the master problem of
U.S. corporate law since the days of Berle and Means, if not before.6
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars began to describe this in terms of “shareholder–manager agency costs.” In this Part, after a brief historical overview,
I review the classic agency cost analysis and then consider the extent to
which things have changed.7
5
6

See infra Part III.
See Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923
(1984) (“[A]fter half a century, discussion of the corporate form still invariably begins with Berle
and Means’ location of the separation of ownership and control as the master problem for
research.”).
7 William Bratton and Michael Wachter come to a similar conclusion, from a different direction, regarding the waning of shareholder–manager agency costs. William W. Bratton & Michael
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 675-88 (2010).
Lynn Stout has been a prominent voice arguing against “shareholder value maximization.” See
generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
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A. A Brief Historical Background
Between the Civil War and World War I, the United States followed a
model of “financial capitalism” in which the large, capital-intensive businesses (railroads, oil, steel, communications, electricity, etc.) were financed
and monitored by a concentrated group of banks led by the Morgan bank.8
The capital needs of large enterprises required the development of equity
and debt markets and became the foundation of the U.S. capital markets.
Because of these companies’ ongoing capital needs, their bankers exercised a
great deal of influence, often placing directors on the boards, replacing
underperforming managers when necessary, and keeping managers focused
on profitably developing their companies.9 During this period, the agency
costs of management in public corporations were relatively low, constrained
by the monitoring by financial intermediaries.
After World War I and through the 1920s, this model broke down for a
variety of economic reasons (e.g., growth of individual stock ownership) and
political factors (e.g., progressive critiques and congressional investigations).10 By the time of the enactment of the Glass–Steagall Act in 1933, the
United States had shifted toward “managerial capitalism.”11 Freed from the
banks by new regulations enforcing a separation of finance and commerce,
no one substituted for J.P. Morgan and the other large, well-placed investors. Executives typically selected directors, who in turn did not effectively
monitor the executives. 12 Product markets were largely insulated from
international competition and thus permitted a great deal of managerial
“slack” before threatening firm solvency. Shareholdings were widely
dispersed with few mechanisms for overcoming barriers to shareholder
8 J. Bradford De Long, Did J.P. Morgan’s Men Add Value?: An Economist’s Perspective on Financial
Capitalism, in INSIDE THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF
INFORMATION 205, 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991).
9 See id. at 214-18 (recounting the monitoring function Morgan’s bankers performed when
serving on boards of directors); see generally RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN
AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 1-161 (1990) (discussing
the bank’s rise during the years leading up to World War I).
10 See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10,
31-53 (1991) (examining the economic, legal, and political pressures that led to the downfall of
financial capitalism).
11 For the classic historical account of the emergence of “managerial capitalism” in the United
States, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977).
12 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the
United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001) (“The
corporate governance structures in place before the 1980s gave the managers of large public
corporations little reason to focus on shareholder concerns. . . . [B]efore 1980, management was
loyal to the corporation, not to the shareholder.”).
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collective action. Executive ownership of equity was very low, so executives
did not have strong financial incentives to maximize firm value.
The period of the “managerial” firm transformed officers’ and directors’
understandings of their roles. They saw themselves as loyal to the corporation rather than to the shareholders. They flirted with the idea of being
“trustees” of the corporate enterprise. They embraced the notion that they
were supposed to manage the corporation for the benefit of all its stakeholders.
During this period, firms retained earnings beyond the immediate need
for investment in profitable projects.13 This further insulated firms from
capital market pressures, as they could fund investments without selling
stock. As a largely unintentional and unnoticed side effect of managerialism,
the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem slipped from view.
B. The Classic Agency Cost Analysis
Beginning more or less with Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s
classic 1976 article, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, finance economists and law professors shifted their
discussion from the “separation of ownership and control”—the phrase
popularized by Berle and Means—to shareholder–manager “agency costs.”14
In reviewing these classic discussions, there are several strands of the
analysis that found at least a certain degree of empirical support.
1. The Core Incentive Story
To start with, there is an incentive story. In a structure in which shareholders bear the residual risk while managers hold fixed claims, managers’
interests will diverge from those of the shareholders, with managers preferring a greater degree of financial certainty than diversified (and thus riskneutral) investors.
The structure of compensation can affect firm value in several ways. First,
pay structures will have a selection effect: performance-based compensation,
its advocates argue, is likely to disproportionately attract higher-skilled and

13 See Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek & David L. Yermack, Managerial Entrenchment and Capital
Structure Decisions, 52 J. FIN. 1411, 1419-22 (1997) for evidence that firms with entrenched managers
use less leverage.
14 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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less–risk averse managers.15 Second, they can have a lock-in effect: performance pay that vests over time, as well as long-term options, can help retain
key employees.16 Finally, pay structures can have a behavioral effect: fixed
pay may lead managers to seek quiet lives, while performance pay can
motivate managers.17
Studies of managerial compensation during the 1960s and 1970s showed
that managers were almost entirely compensated on a fixed basis with few
equity-linked performance incentives. 18 Thus, Brian Hall and Jeffrey
Leibman report that, in 1980, annual chief executive officer (CEO) compensation was mainly in the form of cash salaries and bonuses, with only thirty
percent of CEOs receiving new stock option grants.19
This lack of performance sensitivity led Jensen and Kevin Murphy to
argue that, if CEOs are paid like bureaucrats, “[i]s it any wonder then that
so many CEOs act like bureaucrats rather than the value-maximizing entrepreneurs companies need to enhance their standing in world markets?”20
2. The “Free Cash Flow Problem”
In the classic analysis, the shareholder–manager conflict of interest leads
managers to adopt a variety of different policies that are not in the interest of
diversified shareholders. Thus, some argue that managers will have an
incentive to retain excessive amounts of “free cash flow” (funds over and
above current profitable investment needs) because doing so insulates
managers from the market discipline resulting from the need to attract
investment in new issuances of equity.21 The classic example cited by Jensen
was the oil industry in the wake of the tenfold increase in price (and resulting
recession) in 1973. Oil industry managers found themselves with huge
amounts of free cash flow during a period of industry consolidation. Rather
than distributing the excess cash to shareholders, they overinvested in the oil
industry and made value-decreasing acquisitions in unrelated industries.22
15 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 3, 4 (2002).
16 Id. at 15.
17 Id.
18 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98
J. POL. ECON. 225, 257-58 (1990).
19 Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON.
653, 663 (1998).
20 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But
How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138, 138.
21 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 323, 323 (1986).
22 Id. at 326-27.
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3. Managerial Empire-Building
Another reflection of managerial agency costs could be seen in inefficient levels of corporate acquisitions—or “empire-building.” Because
managers of large enterprises are better compensated than managers of
smaller enterprises,23 managers have a private incentive to expand—even
when doing so is not justified by the returns to shareholders.24 A complementary explanation for costly diversifying acquisitions is that they may reduce
the variance of a firm’s returns. This benefits managers, who depend on their
firms for their high (largely fixed) salaries, even though shareholders can
diversify more cheaply at the portfolio level.25
A number of management theories developed that justified conglomerate
mergers as offering a more efficient mode of enterprise organization. Some
argued that professional managers replaced unsophisticated self-taught
entrepreneurs. 26 Others argued that conglomerates facilitated divisional
monitoring by a central office.27 Still others argued that
the central office reallocated investment funds from slowly growing subsidiaries, which generated cash, such as insurance and finance, to fast growing
high technology businesses, which required investment funds. In this way,
each conglomerate created an internal capital market, which could allocate
investment funds more cheaply and efficiently than the banks or the stock
and the bond markets.28

In fact, however, during the 1960s and 1970s, when diversifying conglomerate
acquisitions were all the rage, the results for shareholders were disappointing.

23 See Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical
Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11, 32 (1985) (finding, empirically, that “in addition to shareholder
return, sales growth is an important determinant of executive compensation”).
24 Jensen, supra note 21, at 323.
25 Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605, 606 (1981).
26 For a brief overview, see HENRY MINTZBERG, MINTZBERG ON MANAGEMENT: INSIDE
OUR STRANGE WORLD OF ORGANIZATIONS 153-72 (1989).
27 See id. at 165-69.
28 Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 SCIENCE 745,
746 (1990). But see Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 137-39 (arguing against the efficiency of
internal capital markets).
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4. Dispersed Ownership, Passive Shareholders,
and Captured Directors
On the classic account, what makes these high levels of agency costs possible is a combination of dispersed ownership, which leaves shareholders
passive, and directors who are appointed and controlled by the CEO.
These explanations found substantial empirical support. During this
period, shareholding was at least as widely dispersed as it had been since
Berle and Means’ analysis in the early 1930s.29 As an analysis of shareholders’
collective action problems would predict, shareholders were in fact mostly
passive. Finally, studies largely confirmed the assertions that CEOs controlled director appointments and that directors viewed themselves as
serving at the CEO’s pleasure.30
5. Managerial Entrenchment and the Resistance
to Hostile Tender Offers
Finally, in the classic account, the most potent engine of managerial
accountability—the hostile tender offer—was undermined by management’s
defensive tactics, by structural features such as staggered boards, and by legal
innovations upheld by Delaware courts, such as poison pills.31 Again, this
account found support in contemporaneous developments.
6. Evidence on the Magnitude of Agency Costs
Agency costs can rarely be observed directly. In the classic agency cost
analysis, the best evidence adduced for significant agency costs has been the
magnitude of the premiums paid in change-in-control transactions and, in
particular, those paid in management buyouts. For example, Jensen argued

29 See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means a Myth?, 83 BUS. HIST. REV.
443, 457 (2009) (citing “[a] number of studies done in the 1960s and 1970s indicat[ing], in the
spirit of Berle and Means, that dispersed ownership was the norm” and noting this view remained
the “received wisdom on ownership and control”).
30 See JAY W. LORSCH WITH ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 20-23 (1989) (finding the composition of most
boards to be “heavily influenced by the CEO”); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND
REALITY 72-85 (1971) (detailing the strength of CEO control, attributed in part to control over
board appointment).
31 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 162-66 (1991) (describing tender offers as a method of control for
shareholders, but noting that Delaware courts have routinely upheld management’s defensive
mechanisms against them).
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that the high premiums (averaging fifty percent) in the 1980s-era leveraged
buyouts were evidence of significant agency costs.32
C. Subsequent Developments: 1980 to the Present
Just as the new shareholder–manager agency cost paradigm was sweeping academia, the world began to change. As I describe below, corporate law
played a largely peripheral role, with market practices taking the lead. In
this Section, I briefly summarize these dramatic developments across each
of the dimensions identified in the classic agency cost account.33
1. The Core Incentive Story
Compensation structures are now well-aligned with shareholder value.
The biggest development since the 1980s is that CEOs now have large
amounts of equity and equity-linked compensation. Jensen and Murphy’s
original “CEOs are paid like bureaucrats” argument34 was undermined in
two ways. First, by looking at the effect of performance on CEOs’ stock and
option holdings, one gets a much fuller view of the performance–
compensation link than by simply comparing changes in salary and bonus to
changes in firm value. Second, starting in 1980, firms began to provide their
CEOs with large amounts of equity-linked compensation.
Thus, although it may have been correct in 1980 to say that CEOs were
largely paid with cash salary and bonuses, the reality has changed dramatically. Between 1980 and 1994, the percentage of CEOs receiving stock
options rose from 30% to close to 70%.35 By 1999, 94% of S&P 500 companies granted options to their top executives.36 By 1998, “the median values

32 Jensen, supra note 21, at 325; Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,
2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 31-32 (1988).
33 This Section summarizes points made in much greater detail in a series of articles that
Marcel Kahan and I have published over the last decade. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 473 (2003) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism]; Marcel Kahan & Edward
B. Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007) [hereinafter
Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
871 (2002) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying]; Marcel Kahan & Edward
Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347 (2011).
34 See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35 Hall & Liebman, supra note 19, at 663.
36 Hall & Murphy, supra note 15, at 4.
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of stock and options held by Standard & Poor’s industrial CEOs and
Standard & Poor’s financial CEOs were $30 million and $55 million,
respectively.” 37 During the 1993–1998 time period, “the ratio of equity
portfolio value to annual total pay was 30.3 on average for CEOs.”38
More recent data confirm this trend. John Core and Wayne Guay examined the pay-performance relationship for the S&P 500 CEOs from 1993 to
2008.39 After converting option values to stock equivalents, they find that
the median CEO receives approximately $5.2 million in annual compensation and holds the equivalent of approximately $40.2 million in firm equity.40
This yields a ratio of annual pay-to-“stock equivalent value” (a proxy for the
effective equity holdings in the firm) of 14.5%.41 Put differently, the median
CEO’s equity ownership is roughly six times his or her annual compensation. This implies a very significant performance sensitivity with most of
that sensitivity deriving from the CEO’s equity holdings and relatively little
from annual compensation.42
Others have looked specifically at CEO incentives in the all-important
change-in-control context. Here, too, incentives have changed. Susan
Elkinawy and David Offenberg, by comparing companies in which unvested
stock and options vest on takeover with those in which they do not, and
using a matched sample of nonacquired companies, show that premiums are
significantly higher when the CEO’s contract includes accelerated vesting.43
Their study also finds that in 75% of the acquisitions in their sample period
(2005–2009), the CEO’s employment contract provided for accelerated
vesting in a change of control.44 In sum, then, the evidence is clear that,
whatever the state of play in the 1960s and 1970s, CEO wealth is now
strongly linked to shareholder value. Although one can find outliers, there is

37 John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & David F. Larcker, Executive Equity Compensation and
Incentives: A Survey, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 27, 28-29 (citing an earlier version
of Hall & Murphy, supra note 15).
38 Id. at 29 (citing John E. Core, Wayne Guay & Robert E. Verrecchia, Are Performance
Measures Other than Price Important to CEO Incentives? 38 tbl.1 (London Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. EFA 0418, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=214132).
39 See John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework (Jan. 28, 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1544018.
40 Id. at 34.
41 Id.
42 See also Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., May 2008, at
5, 11 fig.5 (2008) (comparing CEO salaries with and without equity compensation).
43 See Susan Elkinawy & David Offenberg, Accelerated Vesting in Takeovers: The Impact on
Shareholder Wealth, 42 FIN. MGMT. 101, 111 (2013).
44 Id. at 106.
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no empirical basis for assuming any general divergence between the CEO’s
incentives and shareholder value.
2. The “Free Cash Flow Problem”
Since 1980, there has been a dramatic reduction in retained earnings and
an increase in corporate debt. From 1984 to 1990, approximately 3% of net
public equity was retired each year, totaling around $532 billion for the six
years.45 Figure 1, Bengt Holmstrom and Steven Kaplan’s chart showing net
equity issuances, is revealing:
Figure 146

This widespread reduction of equity continued into the 2000s, peaking
in 2007.47 One effect of this massive increase in leverage is reflected in
Figure 2, showing that between 1982 and 2009, the number of AAA-rated
nonfinancial corporations had dwindled from sixty-one to four.48

45
46
47
48

Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12, at 124-25.
Id. at 125 fig.3.
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 7, at 685-87.
See also Richard John Herring, How Financial Oversight Failed and What it May Portend for
the Future of Regulation, 38 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 265, 266-67 (2010) (noting the decline in AAArated nonfinancial firms).
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Figure 249

The sole remaining survivors are ExxonMobil, Microsoft, Johnson &
Johnson, and Automatic Data Processing.50
This decline in AAA corporate bonds does not reflect a general choice
by firms not to issue debt. Although a few well-known and very successful
firms with large retained earnings would have AAA-rated debt if they issued
any (e.g., Apple), overall corporate debt is at a very high level. According to
the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, corporate debt has grown in all but two
years since 1978.51 In absolute amounts, annual corporate borrowing has
dramatically increased since the late 1970s.52 The result is that the corporate
sector’s outstanding debt has increased roughly ten times, from $757 billion
in 1978 to $7300 billion in 2010.53

49 This chart is taken from Eric Dash, AAA Rating Is a Rarity in Business, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/business/aaa-rating-is-a-rarity-in-business.html?_r=1&emc=
eta1#.
50 Ben Steverman, Pfizer Loses its Triple-A Credit Rating, BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2009/10/pfizer_loses_its_triplea_credit_rating.html.
51 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS THIRD QUARTER 2011, at 7 tbl.D.1 (2011).
52 Id. at 8 tbl.D.2.
53 Id. at 9 tbl.D.3.
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Put differently, the “free cash flow problem” that figured so prominently
in the classic account as evidence of high managerial agency costs has
largely disappeared.
3. The Decline of Managerial Empire-Building
The fashion of diversifying into unrelated lines of business that was
popular from the 1950s through the 1970s came to an abrupt end in the
1980s. With a change in antitrust policy, mergers between firms in the same
industry (horizontal mergers) and between customers and suppliers (vertical
mergers) were no longer considered per se suspect.
The 1980s saw an explosion of deconglomeration. Many conglomerates
built during the 1950s and 1960s were acquired and broken up, with individual
divisions typically sold to firms in the same industry.54
Alongside these market developments, management theories changed. A
return to specialization ensued, with “focus” as the key watchword. Some
conglomerates were broken up by hostile or friendly takeovers, others by
selling or spinning off divisions. The empirical evidence has been clear that
spinning off unrelated businesses leads to a significant improvement in
operating performance.55 As one important study stated, “[T]he operating
performance improvement is . . . consistent with the hypothesis that
spinoffs create value by removing unrelated businesses and allowing managers
to focus attention on the core operations they are best suited to manage.”56
Since the 1990s, spinoffs have been a popular way to increase focus.
Sears spun off Allstate in 1995.57 AT&T spun off Lucent in 1996.58 CBS
carved out its radio operations in Infinity Broadcasting in 1998.59 DuPont
sold off Conoco in 1999 (and it subsequently merged with Phillips to

54
55

See generally Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 12.
See, e.g., Lane Daley, Vikas Mehrotra & Ranjini Sivakumar, Corporate Focus and Value Creation: Evidence from Spinoffs, 45 J. FIN. ECON. 257, 266 (1997); Hemang Desai & Prem C. Jain, Firm
Performance and Focus: Long-Run Stock Market Performance Following Spinoffs, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 75,
90 (1999); James A. Miles & James D. Rosenfeld, The Effect of Voluntary Spin-Off Announcements on
Shareholder Wealth, 38 J. FIN. 1597, 1605 (1983); Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, Effects of
Recontracting on Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Voluntary Spin-Offs, 12 J. FIN. ECON. 437, 447 (1983).
56 Daley, Mehrotra & Sivakumar, supra note 55, at 280.
57 Sears, Roebuck & Co. Spins Off Its Stake in Allstate Division, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1995, at B2.
Sears started Allstate in 1931 and, until it was spun off, the insurer had always been part of Sears.
See id. Now, of course, Allstate is viewed as a completely separate company.
58 AT&T Sets Distribution of Rest of Lucent Shares, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 1996, at B2.
59 Infinity Broadcasting Initial Public Offering Is Priced at $20.50, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 1998, at B23.
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become the sixth-largest publicly traded oil company). 60 And there are
many more examples.
4. Dispersed Ownership, Passive Shareholders,
and Captured Directors
As Marcel Kahan and I have catalogued in detail elsewhere,61 the old
story of dispersed ownership, passive shareholders, and directors under the
thumb of an imperial CEO is no longer accurate.
Share-ownership concentration has continued its nearly inexorable rise,
leading some informed observers, like Brian Cartwright, then Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) General Counsel, to identify the “deretailization” of the stock market as one of the most important developments
affecting the SEC’s role.62 The composition of institutional holdings has
changed: assets have shifted from corporate defined-benefit pension funds
(historically very passive) to mutual funds (which are much more willing to
support shareholder activism).63 Activist hedge funds have emerged as new
players with high-powered incentives and receive support from more
traditional institutions, in terms of both funds to invest and votes cast
during confrontations with portfolio companies.64 Finally, proxy advisory
firms—Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis—have
emerged as information intermediaries and catalysts to shareholder action.65
These pressures, combined with regulatory changes, have transformed
the governance structure of large publicly held firms. Staggered boards—
generally viewed as the most powerful antitakeover device—are in decline.
Between 2003 and 2009 in the S&P 100, the number of companies with
staggered boards declined from forty-four to fifteen.66 That decline has
spread to smaller companies as well.67 Majority voting for directors has
swept the field with boards caving in to shareholder demands.68 “Say on

60 DuPont Completes Split Off of Conoco, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1999, at C19; Phillips, Conoco Set
Merger, CNNMONEY (Nov. 19, 2001, 11:40 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2001/11/19/deals/Phillips_
conoco.
61 See generally Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33.
62 Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Address at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School Institute for Law and Economics: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007)
(transcript available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102407bgc.htm).
63 Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33, at 997-98, 1001-05.
64 See generally Kahan & Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance, supra note 33.
65 Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 33, at 1005-07.
66 Id. at 1008 tbl.2.
67 Id. at 1009.
68 Id. at 1010-11.
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Pay” is now mandatory.69 Through changes in listing requirements and
much greater attention to the board’s monitoring functions, boards have
become much more independent of CEOs than they were in the past. For
example, it is no longer uncommon for outside directors to meet without
the CEO present.70
Increased CEO turnover is perhaps the most dramatic indication of
change. Booz Allen estimates that between 1995 and 2006, annual CEO
turnover has increased by 59% and performance-related turnover by 318%.71
The cumulative effects of these changes can be seen in how directors’
self-understanding of their roles has evolved (what one might call “director
ideology”). Companies, shareholders, business schools, corporate law professors, and judges all seem to believe that the primary responsibility of
directors is to maximize shareholder value. Whether in favor or opposed,
the prevalence of this principle is widely recognized. Thus, a critical 2010
Businessweek article opened with the telling phrase, “If business school were
a church, shareholder value maximization would be its religion.”72
5. Managerial Entrenchment and the Undermining of
Hostile Tender Offers
In the classic account, as described above, hostile tender offers could
constrain managerial agency costs if only the law would let them. In practice, a workaround has been achieved through compensation contracts and
greater board independence, rendering the legal barriers largely pointless.73
In effect, a Coasean bargain was struck between shareholders and managers
in which managers’ legal “entrenchment entitlement” was bought out.
69
70

Id. at 1034-36.
As required by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, stock exchanges mandate at least one such meeting
per year. See NASDAQ OMX, STOCK MARKET RULE 5605(b)(2) (2009); NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.03 (2009).
71 Chuck Lucier, Steven Wheeler & Rolf Habbel, The Era of the Inclusive Leader, STRATEGY
+BUSINESS, Summer 2007, at 3; see also Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO
Turnover Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 83 (2012) (finding that CEO turnover at Fortune 500
companies since 1998 implies an average tenure of less than six years, which is substantially lower
than in previous periods, especially compared to the average decade-long tenures of thirty years
ago).
72 N. Craig Smith & Luk Van Wassenhove, How Business Schools Lost Their Way, BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2010-01-11/how-business-schoolslost-their-waybusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice.
73 See Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 902 (showing how
contracts and institutional structures reduced the entrenchment effect of poison pills); Mark J.
Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1254-56
(2002) (noting that institutions may effectively “‘buy[]’ managers off from opposing takeovers”).
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The mean CEO of an S&P 500 corporation now receives approximately
$5 million in annual salary and bonuses and holds approximately $40 million
in stock or its equivalent.74 The CEO’s change-in-control package typically
includes 2.99 times salary and bonuses, plus acceleration of unvested stock
options. 75 Finally, average CEO tenure is approximately six years. 76 So
imagine that an average CEO in his fourth year receives an offer to buy the
company for even a small premium above current market price, say twenty
percent. What are the CEO’s financial incentives with regard to the offer? If
the company is sold, the CEO will receive $15 million in change-in-control
payments and an $8 million increase in the value of his shares, for a total of
$23 million. If the company is not sold, the CEO will receive an additional
two years of salary and bonus for approximately $10 million. The choice is
stark: $23 million now, and a chance to do something else, versus working
hard for the next two years for $10 million.77
If incentives are effective, then this set of incentives will result in underperforming management stepping aside voluntarily in response to even a
small premium offer to buy the company. Put differently, incentive compensation contracts can substitute for hostile tender offers as a means of
replacing bad managers with good ones. Despite Delaware’s board-centric
takeover jurisprudence from the 1980s that approved poison pills and
deferred to board judgment, mergers and acquisitions have remained at very
high levels.78
The power of incentives can be seen in the practical irrelevance of even
the most potent current antitakeover provision—namely, the charter-based
staggered board combined with a poison pill, a combination that can allow a
company to remain independent for a year and a half against a determined
bidder.
First, the staggered board has become an endangered species because
firms have given in to shareholder pressure with little resistance.79 Second,
even where they exist, staggered boards seem to have only minimal effects on
changes in control. Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates, and Guhan Subramanian

74
75
76
77

Core & Guay, supra note 39, at 36 tbl.3.
Elkinawy & Offenberg, supra note 43, at 112 tbl.III.
Kaplan & Minton, supra note 71, at 81.
Dirk Jenter and Katharina Lewellen find that the likelihood of a bid rises by 50% as the
CEO approaches the age of sixty-five. Dirk Jenter & Katharina Lewellen, CEO Preferences and
Acquisitions 10 (CESifo Working Paper No. 3681, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1975751.
78 See Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 897 (suggesting that
the tactics described above made an end run around Delaware’s takeover standard).
79 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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argue for judicial intervention to undermine the charter-based staggered
board combined with a poison pill, based on a study of the effect of these
boards on hostile bids during the period from 1996 to 2000.80 They identify
ninety-two hostile bids during this period, finding that of the forty-five bids
involving companies with staggered boards, twenty-seven remained independent.81 By contrast, of the forty-seven hostile bids involving companies
without staggered boards, only sixteen remained independent.82 In other
words, in eleven companies, the staggered board arguably resulted in the
company remaining independent when it might otherwise have been
acquired.
To put this in context, there were approximately 3000 acquisitions
between 1996 and 2000, about half of which involved companies with
staggered boards.83 During this period, there were only ninety-two hostile
bids, only forty-five hostile bids against companies with staggered boards,
and, of those, at most eleven in which a staggered board plus poison pill
prevented sale. Academics’ stubborn focus on the “problem” of managerial
resistance to hostile takeovers is remarkable, considering the irrelevance of
takeover defenses in a world in which managers are incentivized to think
like shareholders.
6. Evidence on the Magnitude of Agency Costs
As noted above, some have viewed the magnitude of premiums in goingprivate transactions as evidence of managerial agency costs. It is now clear
that there are a variety of explanations for premiums in going-private
transactions, and the empirical evidence on whether these transactions in
fact involve firms with excess free cash flow is mixed.84 Private equity’s
high-powered incentives, combined with high-powered monitoring, can
generate wealth unrelated to agency costs by facilitating restructuring
decisions that are more difficult in public companies.

80 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 925, 944-45 (2002).
81 Id. at 930, 932.
82 Id. at 930.
83 Kahan & Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism, supra note 33, at 505.
84 For a review of the evidence, see Charlie Weir, David Laing & Mike Wright, Incentive
Effects, Monitoring Mechanisms and the Market for Corporate Control at Going Private Transactions in the UK 7-8 (Feb. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=379101.
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7. What Remains of the Classic Shareholder–Manager
Agency Cost Problem?
If the core shareholder–manager agency cost problem now seems largely
under control (even if there will always be outliers), what aspects remain?
From a theoretical perspective, one can identify several remaining divergences, although the actual magnitude of these problems is unclear. First,
incentives can be too effective even from a shareholder perspective: a CEO
may have an incentive to sell the company even if it would be in the best
interests of the shareholders to refuse all current offers.
Second, even if managers’ incentives are aligned with shareholders,
managers will still want to maximize their compensation. Management
compensation can be too high even if its structure is appropriate. Third, if
managers are overinvested in their own firms, they may manage more
conservatively than diversified shareholders would wish.85 Fourth, small and
very small public corporations may still have high shareholder–manager
agency costs because many of the levers of corporate governance that
squeeze out agency costs in larger public corporations are missing.86 Finally,
end games raise issues that can be difficult to control. Even managers with
an optimal compensation contract may still have an incentive to feather
their nests when the company is being sold.
As interesting as these issues are, they are better characterized as “mopping up operations” than the grand battles against entrenchment and agency
costs of the 1980s. The evidence summarized above, it seems to me, at least
shifts the burden to the anti–agency cost crusaders to show that managerial
agency costs remain significant.
II. SHAREHOLDER–CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS
Suppose I am right that the shareholder–manager agency cost problem
has been brought under control through a combination of incentive compensation, board reforms, changes in the concentration of shareholdings,
85 See Amihud & Lev, supra note 25, at 615 (presenting a study finding that managercontrolled firms pursue risk reduction through conglomerate mergers to a greater extent than
shareholders may desire); Peter Tufano, Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk
Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry, 51 J. FIN. 1097, 1111-12 (1996) (arguing that
conservative financial policies may be one way firms deal with risk). Risk-averse management can
be combated by using option compensation to “add convexity” to compensation contracts. Core,
Guay & Larcker, supra note 37, at 33. In other words, the large upside value of stock options can
incentivize CEOs to adopt optimal strategies that their overinvestment in the firm may cause
them to otherwise resist.
86 Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Governance of Small Public Corporations (manuscript in progress) (on file with author).
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and changes in the willingness of shareholders to oppose management.
What then? Is it the end of history for corporate law?87 Should corporate law
focus on additional tweaks to the system to try to wring out the remaining
shareholder–manager agency costs, on the implicit assumption that any
level of managerial agency costs is too high?
In our preoccupation with the classic “separation of ownership and control” or, more recently, the “shareholder–manager agency cost problem,” we
seem to have forgotten what other corporate law systems have not: that
there are three corporate law agency cost problems, not one.88
Before turning to adaptive strategies, it is worth recalling the elements
of the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem. At its core, the problem is
that shareholders, holding the residual claim on the firm, have an incentive
to externalize risk onto creditors and other fixed claimants. Risk can be
shifted to creditors in at least four different ways.89 First, firms can dilute
their asset bases (“asset dilution”) by siphoning off corporate assets to
shareholders. Second, firms can substitute more risky assets for less risky
assets (“asset substitution”), increasing the riskiness of the firm, which
benefits shareholders at the expense of creditors. Third, the firm can dilute
creditors’ claims (“debt dilution”) by adding unanticipated new debt that is
of equal or superior seniority to existing debt claims. Finally, the firm may
refrain from issuing new equity, even when it has positive net present value
projects, because of the priority of existing debtholders (“debt overhang” or
“underinvestment”).90
So long as managers are in control and think like fixed claimants, retaining free cash flow, creditors will be relatively secure. That is what a AAA
credit rating means: “Obligations rated Aaa are judged to be of the highest
quality, subject to the lowest level of credit risk.”91

87 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
88 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
89 For the following discussion, see KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 116-21 (discussing
asset dilution, asset substitution, and debt dilution); Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979) (analyzing
the areas of conflict between bondholders and stockholders).
90 See generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147
(1977). See also Anat R. Admati, et al., Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation 31-32 (Stanford Univ.,
Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 114, 2012), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2031204.
91 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (2013), available
at http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_79004.
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When shareholders are in control—either through a controlling shareholder or well-organized blockholders, or through equity-incentivized managers—there is less reason to worry about shareholder–manager agency costs.
But the downside of shareholder control is that the incentive to externalize
risk onto creditors comes to the fore. That is why corporate law, especially
in systems that empower shareholders or in which controlling shareholders
are common, has traditionally been concerned with creditor protection.
The interrelationship between the shareholder–manager and shareholder–
creditor agency cost problems is well established theoretically and empirically in the finance literature. Teresa John and Kose John modeled the
relationship between top-management compensation and capital structure.92
In 1993, right around the time that high-powered equity incentives became
standard features of management compensation and the “shareholder empowerment” movement began to pick up steam, they presciently observed
that:
It may be possible to fine tune the compensation structure to align managerial incentives with shareholders interest, minimizing agency costs of equity.
However, such a compensation structure would induce risk-shifting incentives in the managers (i.e., when risky debt is outstanding, equity has a convex payoff structure such that shareholders gain by shifting into higher risk
projects even when the incremental net present value is negative; see Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). A management compensation designed carefully to
minimize the agency costs of equity may give rise to high agency costs of
debt.93

Empirically, as even an incomplete review of the evidence shows, it is
now clear that increasing the alignment of managers and shareholders can
have a significant effect on bondholders. Higher CEO equity incentives are
associated with higher bond yields.94 The announcement of new option
grants negatively impacts bond prices.95 Bond return premiums and managerial ownership are correlated.96 There is a positive relationship between

92 See generally Teresa A. John & Kose John, Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure, 48 J. FIN. 949 (1993).
93 Id. at 951.
94 Chenyang Wei, Covenant Protection, Credit Spread Dynamics and Managerial Incentives
20 (Nov. 29, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/Job
Market_CovenantsSpreadCEOIncentive_ChenyangWei.pdf.
95 Richard A. DeFusco, Robert R. Johnson & Thomas S. Zorn, The Effect of Executive Stock
Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 622-25 (1990).
96 Elizabeth Strock Bagnani et al., Managers, Owners, and the Pricing of Risky Debt: An Empirical
Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 453, 461-64 (1994).
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credit spreads and the Delta (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price)
and Vega (the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility) of a CEO’s total
portfolio of stock and options.97
Better alignment brought about by the presence of powerful shareholders
has similar effects. Shareholder control (as proxied by the presence of
greater-than-five-percent blockholders) can substantially increase bondholder
risk (reflected in bond yields and credit ratings), especially when a firm is
exposed to takeovers.98 The G index of shareholder rights developed by
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick99 is associated with higher
cost of bank debt100 and higher bond yields.101 Even nonbinding shareholder
proposals pushing for better pay-for-performance sensitivity are correlated
with negative abnormal returns for bondholders, and the more leveraged the
target company, the more negative the returns.102
Which creditors does or should corporate law worry about? After all,
creditors come in various forms, including senior secured creditors, bondholders, trade creditors, tort victims, and taxing authorities. In the first
instance, just as the law ignores the heterogeneity of actual shareholders in
analyzing shareholder–manager agency costs, so too it elides the differences
among actual creditors because agency costs of any sort are costs, separate
from who bears them. Second, the law often considers creditors as a group
because they are a useful proxy for the wider nonshareholder social interests
in firm success. Third, the extent to which creditors can protect themselves
(and in so doing protect or not protect other creditors) is a complex question

97 Naveen D. Daniel, J. Spencer Martin & Lalitha Naveen, The Hidden Cost of Managerial
Incentives: Evidence from the Bond and Stock Markets 13-16 (Sept. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=612921; Wei, supra note 94, at 8-10.
98 See K.J. Martijn Cremers, Vinay B. Nair & Chenyang Wei, The Impact of Shareholder
Governance on Bondholders 6-10 (June 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pages.
stern.nyu.edu/~cwei/The%20Impact%20of%20Shareholder%20Governance%20on%20Bondholders.
pdf (basing this finding on a sample from 1990 to 1997).
99 See Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118
Q.J. Econ. 107, 114-19 (2003) (describing the construction of the “Governance Index”).
100 Sudheer Chava, Dmitry Livdan & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Do Shareholder Rights Affect
the Cost of Bank Loans? 26 (Maastricht Univ., EFA 2004, Paper No. 5061, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=495853.
101 Mark S. Klock, Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Does Corporate Governance Matter
to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 693, 708-09 & tbl.3 (2005).
102 Steve Fortin et al., Are Bondholders Happy with Shareholder Proposals? An Empirical
Examination of Pay-Performance Activism 29-32, 35-37 (Dec. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975973. The authors also provide some evidence that targeted
firms engage in more risk-taking behavior after such proposals, with an increase in volatility that
explains the negative bond reaction. Id. at 32.
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that depends on assumptions about the efficiency of contracting and of
markets, and thus enters at a later stage of the analysis.
III. ADAPTIVE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER–
CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS
As Marcel Kahan and I have argued elsewhere, a variety of strategies are
employed to control agency problems in corporations, including contracts,
compensation, governance structures, and legal rules.103 All of these strategies
are used to control shareholder–creditor agency costs.104 Before examining the
role of litigation in controlling residual agency costs, it is important to
consider the various “adaptive mechanisms” by which shareholder–creditor
agency costs are and can be controlled.
A. The Contracting Strategy
The first line of defense will predictably be contracts, as the conflict
between shareholder and bondholder interests is well known to investors,
even if not always appreciated by corporate law scholars. Moreover, as
described above, there is compelling evidence that greater alignment of
manager and shareholder interests exacerbates the shareholder–bondholder
conflict. These conflicts are addressed in two ways: covenants in debt
contracts and pricing.
As described in Clifford Smith and Jerold Warner’s classic analysis, covenants can be divided into a number of categories: restrictions on the firm’s
production/investment policy (including restrictions on disposition of
assets); restrictions on distributions (including restrictions on the payment
of dividends, share purchases, and other forms of distribution); restrictions
on subsequent financing (including limitations on issuing higher-priority
debt and guarantees); modification of payoffs (including sinking funds,
conversion rights, and callability); and bonding activities (including
required reports, specification of accounting standards, and officer certificates of compliance). 105 Michael Bradley and Michael Roberts divide
covenants up into somewhat different baskets: prepayment (covenants that
mandate early retirement of the loan, conditional on some event such as a
103

Kahan & Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying, supra note 33, at 881-87; see also KRAAKsupra note 1, at 39 tbl.2-1 (dividing strategies to protect principals into “ex ante” and
“ex post,” and “regulatory” versus “governance,” yielding a total of ten different strategies).
104 For a very good, short survey, see Charles K. Whitehead, Creditors and Debt Governance, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 68 (Claire A. Hill & Brett
H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
105 See generally Smith & Warner, supra note 89.
MAN ET AL.,
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security issuance or asset sale); financial (limits placed on the level of
different accounting variables); dividend (covenants that restrict distributions to shareholders unless certain conditions are met); and secured debt
(limiting issuance unless issued pari passu with existing secured debt, also
called “negative pledge” covenants).106 As Smith and Warner argued, and
others have argued since, many of these covenants can be understood as
addressing various aspects of the shareholder–bondholder conflict.
Covenants appear in both private and public debt contracts in differing
degrees, due to the very different contracting environments.107 Private debt
has relatively low costs of negotiation and, most importantly, renegotiation,
because the number of parties is very small (often just borrower and
lender). By contrast, public debt has very high costs of renegotiation. A
straightforward transaction-cost analysis would correctly predict more
intense contractual restrictions in private debt than in public debt.
The importance of covenants in private debt is further accentuated by
the relative proportions of public and private debt, with the overwhelming
amount of debt financing coming from private and intermediated bank
lending. According to Joel Houston and Christopher James, the mean
percentage of public debt in their sample is 17% of total debt, with most
firms relying on intermediated (including bank) debt exclusively.108 Bradley
and Roberts confirm this in a much larger and more comprehensive sample,
finding that between 1993 and 2001, private debt issuance was more than
twice the amount of public debt, with most private debt consisting of 364day facilities, revolving loans, and term loans.109
Consistent with the transaction cost view, private debt contains far more
covenants than public debt. Bradley and Roberts find that, for each category
of covenant, more than 70% of the private debt contracts they sampled

106 Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt
Covenants 11-12 (May 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=466240. See generally Avner Kalay, Stockholder–Bondholder Conflict and Dividend Constraints, 10 J.
FIN. ECON. 211 (1982) (examining dividend covenants to support the theory that bond covenants
are structured to control the shareholder–bondholder conflict).
107 For a full discussion of the institutional differences between private and public debt, see
Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance Structure for Corporate
Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 452-69 (1999). On the importance of private debt and the power
wielded by its holders, see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1227-28 (2006).
108 Joel Houston & Christopher James, Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of Private and
Public Debt Claims, 51 J. FIN. 1863, 1871-73 & tbl.I (1996).
109 Bradley & Roberts, supra note 106, at 8-9.
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contain such a covenant.110 In public debt, by contrast, the incidence is never
above 44%, and usually less than 25%.111 Moreover, between 1993 and 2001,
the frequency of covenants addressing additional debt, equity, and asset
sales has increased dramatically: from 18% to 81% (additional debt), 32% to
94% (additional equity), and 25% to 75% (asset sales).112 By contrast, during
the same period the frequency of covenants in public debt declined.113
Not only are covenants very common, they also appear when expected.
Ileen Malitz finds that the poorer a firm’s financial condition, the more
likely its debt will include covenants: large firms are less likely to have
covenants than small (and higher risk) firms and the greater a firm’s existing
leverage, the more likely it is to have covenants in new debt.114 Similarly,
firms that face higher shareholder–bondholder conflicts are more likely to
include restrictive covenants in their debt.115 Robert Nash, Jeffry Netter, and
Annette Poulsen find that high-growth firms are less likely to give up
flexibility in financing (payment of dividends and issuance of debt) than
lower-growth firms.116 Marcel Kahan and David Yermack show that firms
with more investment opportunities are less likely to include restrictive
covenants and prefer to control agency problems through the issuance of
convertible debt.117
The empirical evidence shows that creditor protection is priced in two
senses: (1) creditor protection is associated with lower promised yields at
issue; and (2) there is a significant negative relation between credit spreads
and the degree of covenant protection, controlling for issuer and bond issue
characteristics.118
At issuance, many studies find a negative relationship between the ex
ante pricing of debt and the presence of covenants.119 Indeed, pricing can be
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ileen Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, FIN. MGMT.,
Summer 1986, at 18, 22-23.
115 See Joy Begley & Gerald A. Feltham, An Empirical Examination of the Relation Between
Debt Contracts and Management Incentives, 27 J. ACCT. & ECON. 229, 243-44 (1999) (attributing
restrictive covenants to the greater uncertainty faced by these firms).
116 Robert C. Nash, Jeffry M. Netter & Annette B. Poulsen, Determinants of Contractual Relations Between Shareholders and Bondholders: Investment Opportunities and Restrictive Covenants, 9 J.
CORP. FIN. 201, 229-30 (2003).
117 Marcel Kahan & David Yermack, Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt Securities,
14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 136, 149-51 (1998).
118 Wei, supra note 94, at 13-18.
119 See, e.g., Vidhan K. Goyal, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Evidence From Subordinated Debt
Contracts, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 318, 334 (2005); Natalia Reisel, On the Value of Restrictive
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quite sensitive to differences among firms and issues of bonds. Chenyang
Wei finds that, while “higher CEO risk-taking incentive is associated with
higher credit spreads for bonds with low protection[,] . . . higher CEO risktaking incentive is associated with lower credit spreads for bonds with high
protection.”120 In other words, investors seem willing to pay for covenants
that control CEO risk-taking. Post issuance, Wei provides evidence that
covenants also affect credit spreads. For example, in the face of industrywide or economy-wide shocks, bonds with strong covenant protection
suffered substantially less than those with weak protection.121
The conflict between shareholders and bondholders is particularly prominent in LBOs. Thus, Arthur Warga and Ivo Welch show that, between 1985
and 1989, bondholder losses after LBO announcements ranged on average
between 6% and 7%.122 Lindsay Baran and Tao-Hsien Dolly King, in a study
of a sample of 182 buyouts from 1981 to 2006, find that bondholders suffer
substantial losses and that their losses are larger the bigger and more
prominent the private equity player (proxied by market share).123 Interestingly, bondholders fare worse in club deals than in acquisitions by a single
private equity firm,124 perhaps because a group of private equity firms does
not monitor a portfolio firm’s performance as effectively as does a single
firm, or because they overpay, or both. The scope of their study allows
Baran and King to show that the wealth-transfer effect was of significant
magnitude through two separate buyout waves (the 1980s and the 2000s).125
Creditors’ most powerful protection against loss from LBOs is a
“Change in Control” (CIC) covenant that gives holders the right to sell the
bond back to the issuer at a small premium to par upon a change in control.
The use of CIC covenants has varied over time, usually in response to
bondholder losses. Thus, Kenneth Lehn and Annette Poulsen show that
event-risk covenants increased from 3% of newly issued bonds in 1986 to
32% in 1989.126 Matthew Billett, Zhan Jiang, and Erik Lie find that, in the
Covenants: An Empirical Investigation of Public Bond Issues 5-7 (Dec. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=644522.
120 Wei, supra note 94, at 4 (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 18-20.
122 Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD.
959, 979 (1993).
123 Lindsay C. Baran & Tao-Hsien Dolly King, Going Private Transactions, Bondholder Returns,
and Wealth Transfer Effects, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 1856, 1861 (2010).
124 Id. at 1864.
125 Id. at 1870-72.
126 Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, Contractual Resolution of Bondholder–Stockholder
Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, 34 J.L. & ECON. 645, 662 tbl.1 (1991).
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1980s, only 13% of bond issues had CIC covenants, rising to 31% in the 1990s
and 41% in the 2000s.127 Because issuers often have multiple series of bonds,
the percentage of issuers with CIC covenants in any bond can also be
relevant, at least when the covenant is in a significant percentage of the
outstanding bond principal. Billett, Jiang, and Lie also find that, between
1985 and 1987, fewer than 3% of bonds had CIC covenants.128 By contrast,
during 1989–2006, 13-33% had such covenants.129 Focusing on the 2000s
LBO wave, the authors find that 41% had CIC covenants, compared to 57%
of a control sample of non-LBO firms.130 Wei finds similar variance in the
incidence of CIC provisions in public bonds: 0% for 1980–1984, 20.3% for
1985–1989, 25.9% for 1990–1994, 46.8% for 1995–1999, and 42.4% for 2000–
2003.131 Moreover, riskier debt is more likely to have CIC protections, which
is consistent with an expectation that riskier debt is more likely to be
expropriated in takeovers.132
There is substantial evidence that CIC covenants are effective in protecting bondholders from loss, at least in some market conditions. Baran
and King find that holders of bonds with a CIC covenant trading at a
discount enjoy significant gains in buyouts.133 Billett, Jiang, and Lie, using
bond-pricing data from the 2000s, find losses to bondholders without CIC
covenants but gains to bonds with such covenants.134 The differences are
significant: bonds without CIC covenants lose, on average, 6.8%, while
those with CIC protection gain 2.3%—a swing of around 9%.135
Given the richness of the contractual resources for constraining shareholder opportunism, is contracting alone sufficient? Mark Roe and Federico
Venezze concisely summarize the limits of a pure contractarian approach to
debtor–creditor relationships: contracts are incomplete (and necessarily so,
because of the impossibility of fully specifying state-contingent contracts)
and must be interpreted; courts will be called upon to determine the extent
to which a party is behaving opportunistically and going beyond what contract terms permit; and contracts between the debtor and a creditor or class of
creditors will not adequately protect other parties whose information and
127 Matthew T. Billett, Zhan Jiang & Erik Lie, The Effect of Change-in-Control Covenants on
Takeovers: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 6 tbl.2 (2010).
128 Id. at 6.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 4.
131 Wei, supra note 94, at tbl.II.
132 Billett, Jiang & Lie, supra note 127, at 9.
133 Baran & King, supra note 123, at 1861.
134 Billett, Jiang & Lie, supra note 127, at 11.
135 Id. If, because of interest-rate shifts, bonds are trading at a premium, a CIC covenant
requiring the firm to buy back the bonds would not protect bondholders from loss.
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collective action problems limit their ability to self-protect.136 Finally, boom
and bust credit cycles pose challenges: despite experience with the unfortunate consequences of inadequate protection, we witness the puzzling but
recurring phenomenon of “covenant lite” or “no covenant” lending during
periods of credit-market exuberance. It is not easy for a contractarian to
explain why, when money is cheap, investors are willing to give it away
without adequate protection.137
B. The Compensation Strategy
As described above, the rise of equity-based compensation is a large part
of the story of how we controlled the manager–shareholder agency cost
problem. However, incentivizing managers to think like shareholders
intensifies the shareholder–creditor problem. Compensation structures
seem to be part of the problem; fortunately, they can also be part of the
solution.
Jensen and Meckling’s original analysis suggested that the shareholder–
creditor agency cost problem could be eliminated if executive compensation
mirrored the debt–equity capital structure of the firm:
We have been asked why debt held by the manager (i.e., “inside debt”)
plays no role in our analysis. We have as yet been unable to incorporate this
dimension formally into our analysis in a satisfactory way. The question is a
good one and suggests some potentially important extensions of the analysis.
For instance, it suggests an inexpensive way for the owner-manager with
both equity and debt outstanding to eliminate a large part (perhaps all) of
the agency costs of debt. If he binds himself contractually to hold a fraction
of the total debt equal to his fractional ownership of the total equity he would
have no incentive whatsoever to reallocate wealth from the debt holders to
the stockholders.138

136 Mark J. Roe & Federico Cenzi Venezze, A Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach to Creditor Conduct 21-23 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 12-34, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103217.
137 For an interesting analysis, see Albert Choi & George Triantis, Market Conditions and
Contract Design: Variations in Debt Contracting, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 51 (2013), which suggests that
changes in market conditions affect the usage and nature of covenants.
138 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14, at 352 (footnote omitted).
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Jensen and Meckling’s comments on optimal compensation structures,
which lay fallow for many years, were recently formalized and explored by
Alex Edmans and Qi Liu.139
Others have also explored the properties of inside debt. Rangarajan
Sundaram and David Yermack find that, when managers hold large insidedebt positions, the firm’s likelihood of becoming insolvent is reduced.140
Chenyang Wei and David Yermack, exploiting the better data now available
on executive pensions and deferred compensation, explore investors’
reactions to initial disclosures of CEOs’ inside debt levels (i.e., pensions
and deferred compensation).141 Other work shows that a firm can borrow at
a lower cost when its CEO has a large amount of inside debt, compared to
inside equity, and that fewer bond covenants are observed when the CEO
receives a larger portion of his compensation in pension benefits (a form of
debt).142
Fred Tung, building on some of this literature, has argued for linking
bank executives’ compensation more directly to both equity and subordinated
debt issued by the bank subsidiary of a bank holding company.143 Some of
the other proposals for restructuring banker pay, such as requiring that

139 See generally Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside Debt, 15 REV. FIN. 75 (2011) (advocating for
the inclusion of inside debt in executive compensation).
140 See Rangarajan K. Sundaram & David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role
in Managerial Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1583 (2007) (concluding that CEOs manage more
conservatively when their personal debt-to-equity ratios are higher than their firms’).
141 See generally Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt
Incentives (NYU Stern Sch. of Bus. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. FIN-09-020, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1519252 (finding that, upon disclosure, equity prices fall and
debt values rise, while volatility falls for both).
142 Wei and Yermack provide a good summary of the findings:

Several recent working papers . . . generally find that, in many settings, firms face
a lower cost of debt when the CEO has a high ratio of inside debt to inside equity
compensation . . . . Chava, Kumar and Warga (2010) find a lower incidence of
bond covenants when CEOs receive more of their compensation in the form of a
pension, the largest type of inside debt. Bolton, Mehran and Shapiro (2010) study
how inside debt can reduce risk-taking by bank CEOs and find event study evidence
similar to ours, with a bank’s credit default swap spreads becoming more narrow
when it discloses large pension and deferred compensation holdings by its management. A related paper by Tung and Wang (2010) concludes that bank CEOs with
large amounts of inside debt compensation exposed their firms to less risk and as a
result performed better during the crisis.
Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
143 See Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk
Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1205, 1245-47 (2011) (arguing that compensating bankers with
subordinated debt would provide clearer signals and incentives).
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managers hold shares for several years after leaving the firm,144 may provide
the same sort of alignment.
The virtues of including both debt and equity in managers’ compensation contracts extend beyond the regulated financial institution sector. By
including both elements, a compensation contract can help control the
distortion in incentives created by relying exclusively on one or the other.
Debt holdings temper managers’ willingness to risk bankruptcy as the value
of equity drops towards zero; equity incentivizes managers to increase firm
value.
A key design question for mixed equity–debt executive compensation is
the degree to which contracts must mirror firms’ capital structure in order
to control shareholder–creditor opportunism, and what the resulting costs
to firms might be.145 This is important because a firm’s capital structure
changes over time—in some cases quite dramatically. The existing research
suggests that even a crude mix of equity (through stock and option ownership) and debt (through deferred compensation and pension benefits) can
have powerful effects on the likelihood of bankruptcy and the cost of
credit.146 There are a wide variety of ways to introduce debt into incentive
compensation, including the use of credit default swaps.147
C. The Governance Strategy
In an important article, Doug Baird and Bob Rasmussen focus on the
corporate governance structures created by the extensive rights given to
senior creditors in complex lending agreements:
The presence of such an institutional lender fundamentally alters corporate governance. The lending agreement contains many affirmative and negative covenants that give the lender de facto control over every aspect of the
business. Moreover, the complete control the lender has over the debtor’s
cash flow gives the lender veto power over every course of action, whether
144 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 1915, 1925-28 (2010); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay,
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 n.3 (2010); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term 6-9 (Yale Program for Studies in Law, Econ. &
Pub. Policy, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 374, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1336978.
145 For a very good and accessible summary, see Alex Edmans, How to Fix Executive Compensation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at R1.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., Hans Bystrom, Executive Compensation Based on Asset Values, 32 ECON. BULL.
1504, 1505 (2012).
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internal to the corporation or outside it. Decisions normally reserved for
directors and stockholders—such as whether to sell a division, change the
business plan, or replace the managers—require the lender’s explicit blessing. Trip wires are tied to the performance of the business and its discrete
units, and a general provision gives the lender the ability to call the loan in
the event of any material adverse change. The purpose of these trip wires is
not to force repayment of the loan, but rather to ensure that lenders have
control over major decisions and the ability to insist on changes in management when the business encounter reverses.148

Baird and Rasmussen, taking the conventional view of corporate governance
as focused on controlling shareholder–manager agency costs, analyze the
various ways in which private lenders are able to constrain managerial
agency costs when the firm runs aground.
Relax their assumption that the conventional story is right, and consider
the implications of the developments summarized earlier. If, as I argue, the
shareholder–manager agency cost problem has been substantially replaced
by a shareholder–creditor agency cost problem, the subtle and complex
features of “debt governance” described by Baird and Rasmussen can be
understood as constraining attempts by shareholders and their loyal managers to take advantage of creditors. Indeed, this understanding is bolstered by
the triggering structure: the senior lenders’ governance rights primarily
come into play when the firm encounters financial distress—when the risk
of shareholder–creditor opportunism comes to the fore. Moreover, the
rough timing of the evolution of debt governance described by Baird and
Rasmussen fits my story well. They trace the development of private-debt
governance to Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 and revised Article 9
(effective 2001), which increased a senior lender’s ability to secure a debt
with all current and later-acquired corporate assets.149 As such, their story is
a story of the 1990s and 2000s, the periods during which, the evidence

148 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 1227-28 (footnote omitted). For an earlier analysis
of debt’s governance role, and the development of the notion of default clauses in lending
agreements as “trip wires,” see George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in
Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1093-94 (1995). Triantis and Daniels
write, “[Debt covenants] serve as trip wires for the lender’s right to accelerate and enforce or to
intervene in the borrower’s decisions.” Id.
149 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 107, at 1228. On the development of the law under Article
9 and revised Article 9, and how these provisions affect a lender’s ability to take security interests,
see Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9?:
Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1357, 1364-65 (1999). See generally Steven L.
Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and Impact, 9
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (2001).
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described above shows, the shareholder–manager agency cost problem was
substantially brought under control.150
IV. GRAPPLING WITH RESIDUAL SHAREHOLDER–
CREDITOR AGENCY COSTS
In the eighty years since Berle and Means posed the question, endless
variants of the shareholder–manager agency cost problem have been
analyzed. What do contemporary shareholder–creditor conflicts look like,
now that managers largely think like shareholders and the world has at least
partially adapted? In earlier parts, I examined ways in which the shareholder–creditor conflict is controlled by incentives, contracts, and governance. In
this Part, I want to explore the available legal resources for controlling two
residual shareholder–creditor conflicts that strike me as illustrative. The
first type of conflict is a “last period problem,” illustrated by the rapid
failures of some gigantic 2007 LBOs. The second type of conflict, illustrated
by the recent battle at Dynegy, involves attempts by shareholders and
shareholder-oriented managers to exploit complex corporate subsidiary
structures to wrest value away from creditors during financial distress.151 As
we will see, the same set of doctrinal resources, in different measures, can
respond to both challenges. My interest in these case studies is to examine
the tools available and how those tools interact with each other in controlling what seem to be examples of shareholder–creditor opportunism.
A. A Failed LBO
Background legal rules both support contracting and act as a backstop to
prevent fraud and opportunism. To get a sense of the role of these fundamental legal rules, consider the following hypothetical. This hypothetical,
inspired by some of the failed LBOs of 2007 to 2008,152 is designed to
150 Creditor governance of the sort described by Baird and Rasmussen raises the specter of
“lender liability.” Roe and Venezze present an interesting “corporate law” approach to the legal
treatment of creditor governance that has the potential to provide more certainty to creditors in
controlling management behavior during financial distress, which is desirable in a world in which
managers think like shareholders. See Roe & Venezze, supra note 136, at 19-20 (applying the
corporate law doctrines of entire fairness review and business judgment deference to the creditor
context).
151 For an in-depth analysis of one example of this type of conflict, see generally Richard
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605 (2011).
152 See Michael Simkovic & Benjamin S. Kaminetzky, Leveraged Buyout Bankruptcies, the
Problem of Hindsight Bias, and the Credit Default Swap Solution, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 118, 124
(2011) (“There has recently been a surge in fraudulent transfer litigation.”). The authors go on to
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provide a best-case scenario for legal intervention in which some of the
behavior verges on fraud.
*

*

*

Target Corp. is being sold at a very high price in a highly leveraged buyout. Target’s senior managers have substantial equity stakes through ownership of stock and options, as well as “inside debt” through deferred
compensation and pension benefits. They plan to cash out and devote
themselves to recreational activities once the sale closes. In the course of the
sale process, they have directed the preparation of new projections that, to
an impartial eye, would be found to be wildly optimistic or even fraudulent.
The board knows that the juiced projections were prepared for the marketing effort, that they have minimal foundation, and that the buyers and their
financing banks have been relying upon them without realizing just how
juiced they are.
Suppose that, on the eve of approving the highly leveraged sale, or on
the eve of the closing, Target’s bankers tell Target’s board that, as soon as the
deal closes, the company will be insolvent, leaving some of the existing
creditors unpaid. “Given the price that Buyer is paying for the shares, the
amount of debt it is putting on the company, and the likely cash flow,” say
the bankers in a moment of candor, “there is no way it’ll survive.”
May the board, consistent with its duties, go forward with the deal?
Suppose they were to do so, and the company fails shortly after closing; do
the directors face any liability? Given that Target shareholders are thrilled
with the price and will exit in the sale, must the board go forward with the
deal? Should it choose not to, will it face any liability to Target shareholders?
*

*

*

Before turning to the legal treatment of this hypothetical, consider how
it could slip through the web of adaptive constraints described above
(contracting, compensation, and governance) and harm pre-LBO unsecured
creditors (as well as employees, communities, suppliers, and customers).
Existing senior lenders will be largely indifferent so long as they are paid

state, “There have already been several major cases brought and the data suggest that there are far
more in store.” Id. at 124 n.11 (citing 3V Capital Master Fund Ltd. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of TOUSA, Inc. (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 444 B.R. 613 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff ’d in part, rev’d in
part, 680 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012); Tribune Media Servs., Inc. v. Beatty (In re Tribune Co.), 418
B.R. 116 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Complaint, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., 402 B.R. 571 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-10023 (REG)), 2009 WL 2350776).
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back at closing. The new banks financing the LBO can be expected to
recognize the misaligned incentives of selling managers and to conduct due
diligence to assure themselves that the post-LBO company will be solvent
(especially given the threat of a fraudulent conveyance challenge, as discussed below). There are, however, limits to the effectiveness of due diligence in protecting pre-LBO creditors, given the fundamental asymmetry
of information between sellers and buyers. For bondholders, change-incontrol covenants would have protected them, but during some periods of
the business cycle, bonds are issued with minimal protection. Managers’
financial incentives created by compensation structures are unlikely to
protect creditors when the company is being sold and managers are exiting.
Finally, private debt’s governance levers will come in to play only after the
firm is in financial distress.
Consider, now, how this failed-LBO hypothetical would be analyzed
under U.S. law.153 In appraising the adequacy of current U.S. approaches, it
is worth keeping in mind Bayless Manning’s summary of the core creditorprotection goals of corporate law:
If the hierarchical relationship of creditor to shareholder is to have any
meaning at all, then the management must not be left free to shovel all the
assets in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when the corporation has insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the shareholder distribution renders the corporation unable to pay its creditors. The central
point is to avoid insolvency.154

1. The Bankruptcy Approach: Fraudulent Conveyance
A large number of failed LBOs end up in bankruptcy courts. When this
occurs, three categories of claims are often asserted: claims under the
Bankruptcy Code to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations and to
recover amounts transferred; actions to subordinate the claims of the LBOfinancing parties to the claims of pre-LBO creditors; and state law claims
against the parties who effectuated or participated in the transaction,
including breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duties, unjust enrichment, and recovery of illegal distributions.155
153
154
155

For a brief analysis under U.K. law, see infra text accompanying notes 349-364.
BAYLESS MANNING WITH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 63 (3d ed. 1990).
See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 152, at 97-126 (including these types of counts); see also 2
Report of Kenneth N. Klee, Examiner at 4-5, In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (KJC) (Bankr. D.
Del. July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Klee Report] (detailing the three claims categories).
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Typically, the magnitude of the LBO debt—which occupies a senior
position—will dwarf other claims. As a result, if the LBO debt remains
senior, the LBO creditors will recover on all the claims asserted (including
claims against themselves, for example, for aiding and abetting). On the
other hand, if the pre-LBO creditors are able to avoid the LBO debt (or
have it subordinated), they will move to the head of the line. Together,
these considerations make the actions to avoid the LBO debt the “main
event,” in comparison to which everything else fades into the background.156
a. The Basic Theory
The outlines of the fraudulent transfer approach to an LBO track the
language of the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer provision § 548(b)
and the parallel incorporation of state fraudulent transfer law through
§ 544(b).157 There are several elements to the analysis.
First, there is the question of what can be avoided. Under § 548, the
bankruptcy trustee may avoid any “transfer . . . of an interest of the
debtor in property, or any obligation . . . incurred by the debtor, that was
made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition.”158 In the LBO context, there are two principal potential applications of this provision: the transfer of cash by the Target firm to its shareholders, and the Target’s obligation to repay the banks who financed the
transaction.
Second, there is the question of the circumstances under which transfers or
obligations can be avoided. Under § 548, there are two separate possibilities.
First, transfers or obligations may be avoided when they were incurred
“with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or
such obligation was incurred, indebted.”159 This is the “actual fraud” or
“intentional fraudulent transfer” prong, and it focuses on the transferor’s

156 See Klee Report, supra note 155, at 4-10 (outlining potential actions to avoid and recover,
comprising this “main event”).
157 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(b) (2006). Section 548 generally parallels the structure of state
law fraudulent transfer statutes and will be the focus of my discussion.
158 Id. § 548(a)(1). State fraudulent transfer law, although overlapping with the Bankruptcy
Code’s provision, may not be entirely duplicative. For example, the “reach-back” period may vary.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1309(1), (2) (2005) (allowing for a reach-back period of four
years).
159 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
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intent and knowledge.160 The effect of a transfer is generally taken to be
indicative of intent.161
Alternatively, transfers or obligations incurred may be avoided if the
debtor, voluntarily or involuntarily, “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation”162 and, also, was either
“insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation,”163 or
“was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was
an unreasonably small capital.”164 This is the “constructive fraud” prong.
Because of the difficulties and uncertainty involved with proving intentional
fraudulent transfer, the constructive fraudulent transfer prong is generally
used to challenge failed LBOs.165
Each of the elements of the constructive fraud approach must be satisfied. The first can be applied straightforwardly to the LBO context. Bankruptcy courts and doctrines commonly seek to focus on “substance” rather
than “form” and are thus open to collapsing the various steps of the transaction, in appropriate circumstances. In determining whether to collapse the
transactions, courts in the Third Circuit (most relevant because Delaware is
in the Third Circuit) consider three factors: “First, whether all of the
parties involved had knowledge of the multiple transactions. Second,
whether each transaction would have occurred on its own. And third,
whether each transaction was dependent or conditioned on other transactions.”166 In the typical LBO—where each piece closes simultaneously and is
mutually dependent, and where each participant knows how the transaction
160
161

Klee Report, supra note 155, at 16.
See, e.g., United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1305 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“[A] party is deemed to have intended the natural consequences of his acts.” (emphasis added)); see
also Moody v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1075 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In Tabor Court Realty
Corp. we relied in part on the principle that ‘a party is deemed to have intended the natural
consequences of his acts’ in upholding the district court's finding of intentional fraud.”).
162 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i).
163 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
164 Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
165 See Moody, 971 F.2d at 1064.
166 Mervyn’s L.L.C. v. Lubert-Adler Grp. IV, L.L.C. (In re Mervyn's Holdings, L.L.C.), 426
B.R. 488, 497 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (citations omitted); see also The Liquidation Trust of
Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Fin. Grp. (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del.), 327 B.R.
537, 547 (D. Del. 2005) (“Each step of the Transaction would not have occurred on its own, as each
relied on additional steps to fulfill the parties’ intent and merge . . . .”). For a full discussion of
the case law, and whether bad faith must be shown to justify collapsing, see Klee Report, supra note
155, at 86-90.
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is structured (if for no other reason than that it will be disclosed in the
proxy statement)—these conditions will routinely be satisfied.
Consider first the payments to the shareholders. If one views the LBO
as a distribution to shareholders that does not benefit Target, then it looks
clearly to be at an undervalue. The corporation receives no benefit from
receiving its shares back from its shareholders, as that does not bring any
capital into the firm, and does not allow it to invest in any projects. Turning
to the obligations incurred to the banks that financed the LBO, once the
steps of the transaction are collapsed, and proceeds of the loan have been
paid out to shareholders, it is hard to see how Target has received “equivalent value.”
The second element of constructive fraud requires that the transfer or
obligation incurred have occurred when the firm was or was rendered
“insolvent” according to one of the two standard measures of insolvency:
balance sheet insolvency (liabilities exceed assets) or some version of an
“equity insolvency” test such as the one contained in § 548—that is, “engaged in business . . . for which any property remaining with the debtor
was an unreasonably small capital” or “intended to incur, or believed that
the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor’s ability to
pay as such debts matured.”167 In the LBO context, this becomes the domain
of expert financial testimony and is obviously fact-specific. The key question under any of the solvency tests is whether at the time of the transfer or
obligation incurred, the firm was or became insolvent.168
b. Is the Current Framework Sufficient? Some Doubts About
Exclusive Reliance on Fraudulent Transfer Law
When fraudulent conveyance law was first applied to failed LBOs, it was
controversial and seemed to many to be a poor fit.169 Over time, fraudulent
conveyance law has come to play an important role in bankruptcy cases.
That said, from a corporate law perspective, it still seems odd that anyone
would want fraudulent conveyance law to be the exclusive or even the
primary framework for litigation over failed LBOs. While one could argue
that we do not want managers to have multiple masters, and that the most
167
168

11 U.S.C. § 548(a). See generally Simkovic & Kaminetzky, supra note 152.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i), the trustee may completely avoid any constructively
fraudulent transfer. This is in contrast to §§ 548(c) and 550(a) where the avoidance is limited to
the extent the debtor received less than equivalent value.
169 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 852 (1985) (“A firm that incurs obligations in the course of
a buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother for a
pittance.”).
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efficient structure is to have managers act in the shareholders’ interest and
for LBO lenders to act in their own interests (and indirectly the interests of
other creditors) by constraining the LBO sponsor, I am unconvinced. As I
discuss below, the “single master” argument seems to exacerbate shareholder–creditor agency costs at precisely the critical moment. Further, it implies
that directors should, or even must, approve my hypothetical LBO even
when they know that it will render the firm insolvent, as it is indisputably in
shareholders’ interests to do so.170
First, to the extent that the core “creditor protection” goal is, as Manning puts it, that “management must not be left free to shovel all the assets
in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when the corporation has
insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the shareholder distribution
itself renders the corporation unable to pay its creditors,”171 focusing on the
lenders rather than on the managers is to ignore the key actors. Even if the
LBO lenders are aware that the transaction is a single unified transaction in
which debt is being substituted for equity, they are neither the initiating
parties, nor the actors with fiduciary duties to the corporation or with direct
access to the relevant information, including projections. Indeed, because of
competition with other lenders, it is likely that they are lending at market
rates. The real justification for imposing obligations on them, backed by the
threat of losing priority to older creditors in bankruptcy, seems to be to
recruit them to force the LBO sponsors and the Target firm to adopt a
sound financial structure.172
To one steeped in Delaware’s approach to corporate law—and to those
with knowledge of how the same set of problems is handled in other
corporate law systems—it is surprising that the analysis does not focus on
the directors’ decision to approve a transaction that distributes funds to the
shareholders ahead of the creditors and results in the bankruptcy of the
company.
Second, to impose liability on the LBO lenders is, in effect, to penalize
some creditors for not adequately looking out for other creditors. This is in

170
171
172

See infra text accompanying notes 234-236.
MANNING, supra note 154, at 63.
In so doing, it is analogous to imposing successorship liability in products liability cases as
a way of forcing selling firms to make adequate provision for tort victims. See generally Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 203 (1993).
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tension with the general principle that creditors do not have duties to look
out for the interests of other creditors.173
Third, the fraudulent transfer model—in focusing on the transferor and
the transferee—would seem to demand that the transferee return the
improper transfer. In the LBO context, that would require the shareholders
to return the amounts received for their shares. Yet, in a world of intermediaries and custodial holding of securities, unwinding securities transactions can pose systemic risks. As a result, the Bankruptcy Code contains a
broad limitation on avoidance powers that can be exercised on behalf of a
bankruptcy estate when a transfer is a “settlement payment.”174 This provision has been interpreted very broadly as barring the avoidance of LBO
shareholder payments for claims asserted under § 548 of the Bankruptcy
Code, other than those made with actual fraudulent intent.175 Given the
complexities of clawing back payments made to dispersed shareholders,
corporate law’s strategy of providing directors with incentives not to make
such payments in the first place makes sense.
Fourth, the heavy reliance on the fraudulent transfer framework has
meant that a variety of cases that pose issues at the heart of corporate law’s
creditor-protection function—that could provide the grist for the common
law mill—do not do so. With bankruptcy focused primarily on priority,
directors’ duties receive relatively little attention. At the same time, far less
typical fact patterns—the creditor-regarding duty cases that actually arise in
Delaware—become the basis upon which these duties are developed. This is
not just a lost opportunity. It also distorts the development of doctrine and
provides directors with a misleading and incomplete role description.
In the early 1980s, when management buyouts (MBO) first emerged in
significant numbers, directors were confused about their duties.176 Some
thought their duty was to decide between the management group’s offer to
buy the company and remaining independent. In a line of decisions, the
173 See Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 22 (1991) (“A creditor has to care about whether the debtor will pay it back, not
whether the debtor will pay back anyone else.”).
174 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006).
175 See, e.g., Brandt v. B.A. Capital Co. (In re Plassein Int’l Corp.), 590 F.3d 252, 257-59 (3d
Cir. 2009) (LBO of private corporation); QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford (In re QSI Holdings, Inc.),
571 F.3d 545, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2009) (same); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 F.3d 981,
986 (8th Cir. 2009) (same); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l, Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l, Inc.), 181 F.3d
505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999) (LBO of public corporation). But see Munford v. Valuation Research Corp.
(In re Munford, Inc.), 98 F.3d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply § 546(e) to LBO
payments).
176 See generally Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997) (describing the evolution of directors’ duties through MBO case law).

2013]

The New Shareholder-Centric Reality

1947

Delaware courts ultimately made it clear that that was not the right way to
think about what, in essence, would be a decision to sell the company.
Rather, Delaware courts made it clear that directors in MBOs must allow
some sort of “market test” before selling the company to the management
group. Board practices changed.
There seems to be an analogous misunderstanding of directors’ duties
with regard to highly leveraged transactions. There needs to be an analogous reorientation of directors’ perceptions. Although the injunction to
“maximize shareholder value” is a decent shorthand description of directors’
duties during normal times, it gives the wrong message when the means of
maximizing shareholder value—highly leveraged transactions—threaten the
company with insolvency. As discussed below, because of the oddities of our
judicial architecture, we do not have the same intensity of judicial attention,
and that lack has led to insufficient attention in the case law specifying
directors’ duties.
2. Delaware Corporate Law Doctrines
With most of the fallout from failed LBOs playing out in the bankruptcy
courts and targeting LBO lenders, it is not surprising that corporate law
doctrines and remedies have remained at the margins.177 To the extent that
corporate law will adapt to the reappearance of the shareholder–creditor

177 Thus, in the bankruptcy cases, discussions of both fiduciary duty and improper distribution theories typically appear only after the main discussion of fraudulent transfer theories against
the various defendants. In In re Buckhead America Corp., which contains the fullest discussion of
these theories, their analysis comes only after discussions of the fraudulent transfer claims (Section
B), tortious interference (Section C), and “other claims relating to indentures” (Section D), before
the final section that discusses the “alter ego theory of liability.” Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Buckhead Am. Corp. v. Reliance Capital Grp., Inc. (In re Buckhead Am. Corp.), 178
B.R. 956, 961-75 (D. Del. 1994); see also Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc. v. Lewis, 129 B.R. 992,
1000-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (improper distribution); Weiboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R.
488, 511-12 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (same); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 584-85
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (majority shareholder duty), aff ’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v.
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986).
Similarly, the theories appear in court-appointed examiners’ reports in a somewhat marginal
way. Thus, in Barry Zaretsky’s seminal report in the Revco bankruptcy, Report of Barry Zaretsky,
Examiner at 117-24, In re Revco D.S., Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2966 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 17,
1990) (Nos. 588-1308 to 588-1321, 588-1305, 588-1761 to 588-1812, 588-1820), he discussed claims
under Delaware General Corporate Law sections 160 and 174, but relatively late in the report. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 174 (2011) (corporation’s voting and ownership powers, and
director liability, respectively). Likewise, in Kenneth Klee’s four-volume examiner’s report in the
Tribune bankruptcy, the improper distribution claims do not appear until near the end of the
second volume. See Klee Report, supra note 155, at 406.
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agency cost problem, these doctrines will form the starting point—the
“doctrinal resources” for addressing this new–old problem.
Restrictions on distributions to shareholders, whether through share
repurchases or dividends, have a long and complicated history.178 Before
turning to the restrictions and liabilities under Delaware law, it is important
to understand how these types of rules work. There are two kinds of legal
tools for restricting distributions: limits on the sources of distributions and
limits on the effects of distributions. Generally, three factors enter into the
determination: the corporation’s cash flow, its earnings, and its net assets.179
The traditional limitation on the source of distributions is that they
must be out of “surplus,” a term of art.180 There are two ideas behind this
restriction. First, distributions should not be made to shareholders when the
firm already owes more money to creditors and preferred shareholders than
its assets are worth. Second, at least a portion of the equity capital is
committed for the life of the firm and provides a cushion to protect creditors and others dealing with the firm. This cushion must thus be protected
from distributions to shareholders. Although this class of restrictions is
often referred to as a “balance sheet solvency test,” it is quite different from
true accounting-based tests, and the “balance sheet” need not be prepared
according to GAAP.181
How the “balance sheet insolvency” test is implemented has changed
over time and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In contrast to the
Model Business Code, Delaware takes a very traditional approach to
restricting distributions. Under Delaware law, dividends and share repurchases can be funded out of “surplus,” which is defined as the amount of
“net assets” in excess of “capital.”182 “Net assets” is defined as the amount by
which total assets exceed total liabilities.183 “Stated capital” cannot be less
than the “par value” of all shares with “par value,” but may be more, at the
board’s discretion.184 If shares are issued without par value, as is permitted
under Delaware law, the board will determine at the time of issue what
portion will be considered “capital.”185

178
179

For the leading account, see BAYLESS MANNING, LEGAL CAPITAL, supra note 154.
BARBARA BLACK, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS AND STOCK REPURCHASES §§ 1:3, 6:4

(2004).
180 For a classic discussion of the concept of “surplus” and the confusion it engenders, see
MANNING, supra note 154, at 74-78.
181 BLACK, supra note 179, § 1:3.
182 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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A board may thus repurchase shares or pay dividends so long as total
assets are greater than total liabilities plus capital. 186 When the market
values of the assets and/or liabilities differ from the book value, the board
may revalue the assets and liabilities (upward or downward) on the basis of
such information as it considers reliable, with no specific method mandated
by the courts.187
The second type of limitation on distributions to shareholders looks not
at the source of distributions but at their effect on creditors. These are
known as “equity insolvency tests” and focus on the corporation’s cash flow.
Here, the idea is to prohibit distributions when the corporation is unable to
pay its debts as they come due, or would be rendered unable by the distribution.188 Thus, for example, the Model Business Code provides, “No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect: (1) the corporation would not
be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business . . . .”189 Although Delaware’s statutes do not contain “equity insolvency” limitations, the case law does, as I discuss below.
Before turning to the application of Delaware doctrine, recall exactly
what an LBO is. An LBO is an acquisition of a target company, through any
of a variety of different structures, in which a significant portion of the
purchase price is borrowed, with the loan ultimately secured by the assets of
the target company.190 Although there are a host of alternative structures
available, the reverse triangular merger has become the standard approach
for LBOs in the United States. To illustrate briefly, Buyer establishes an
acquisition shell, NewCo, and, if a toehold position is desired, NewCo
acquires it. After reaching terms with Target, NewCo merges with Target,
with Target as the surviving corporation, and with Target’s shareholders
receiving cash for their shares. Simultaneously at closing, funds are borrowed from Lender to pay Target’s shareholders, secured by Target’s

186
187

Id. § 170(a)(1).
Delaware also provides for “nimble dividends.” “In case there shall be no such surplus, [a
company may declare and pay dividends] out of its net profits for the fiscal year in which the
dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year.” Id. § 170(a), (a)(2). The idea behind this
type of provision is that a troubled firm must be able to promise dividends to new equity if it is to
issue stock and stave off failure.
188 BLACK, supra note 179, § 1:3.
189 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40 (2008).
190 See David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73, 81-83 (1985)
(describing various ways to structure an LBO).
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assets.191 In order to complete the transaction, Target’s board must recommend it and Target’s shareholders must approve it.
The creditor protection issue in an LBO is clear: debt is substituted for
equity. Target’s shareholders are bought out, potentially leaving Target’s
pre-LBO creditors high and dry, with none of the proceeds of the loans
(secured by Target’s assets) invested in Target projects. LBOs thus raise the
specter of “asset dilution”—the siphoning off of assets to the shareholders,
leaving creditors worse off.
a. Theory I: The Delaware Limitations on Share Repurchases
Given what LBOs do, it is reasonable to view them as share repurchases.
As noted above, Delaware adopts a “balance sheet insolvency” limitation on
share repurchases. Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) section
160(a) provides (in relevant part):
Every corporation may purchase, redeem, receive, take or otherwise acquire,
own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, pledge,
use and otherwise deal in and with its own shares; provided, however, that
no corporation shall:
1) Purchase or redeem its own shares of capital stock for cash or other
property when the capital of the corporation is impaired or when such
purchase or redemption would cause any impairment of the capital of the
corporation . . . .192

191 As Carlson points out, there are numerous alternative modes of structuring the acquisition, all with the same outcome. Id. at 83. Modifying Carlson’s description slightly, all of the
following structures produce similar results, although they may have different legal consequences:


Newcorp borrows from Lender and simultaneously uses the proceeds to purchase
Target’s stock, which is pledged to secure the loan.



Newcorp borrows from Lender, uses the proceeds to buy Target’s stock, and causes
Target to guarantee the loan to Newcorp.



Target borrows from Lender, with loan secured by Target’s assets, and uses the proceeds to repurchase shares from shareholders other than Buyer.



Newcorp borrows from Lender to acquire Target’s shares. Target borrows acquisition
funds secured by its assets and pays them out as a dividend to Newcorp to repay the
loan. Each step closes simultaneously.



Target borrows from Lender, secured by Target’s assets, then relends to Newcorp,
which uses the funds to purchase shares.

Target with substantial subsidiaries arranges a loan to Target, secured by subsidiaries’
assets or guarantees, and uses proceeds to buy shares.
192 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a).
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In addition, there is a longstanding common law “equity insolvency” test
that prohibits a corporation from repurchasing its shares when the corporation is or would be rendered unable to pay its debts as they come due.193
DGCL section 174(a) imposes liability on directors for improper share
repurchases, liability that cannot be exculpated under DGCL section
102(b)(7). 194 Because Delaware law contains both “balance sheet” and
“equitable” insolvency limitations on share repurchases, if a hypothetical
LBO that rendered the firm insolvent is viewed as a share repurchase, it
would quite clearly violate DGCL section 160.195
Section 172, however, provides directors with a defense when they rely
in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any
of its officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by
any other person as to matters the director reasonably believes are within
such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has been
selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation, as to the
value and amount of the assets, liabilities and/or net profits of the corporation or any other facts pertinent to the existence and amount of surplus or
other funds from which dividends might properly be declared and paid, or
with which the corporation’s stock might properly be purchased or
redeemed.196

As with other parallel provisions, such as section 141(e),197 such reliance
must be reasonable.198 Directors’ liability would thus depend on the reasonableness of their reliance on the information they had before them about the
solvency of the post-LBO company. From a counseling perspective, this
provides a clear incentive to make sure that the board has a strong basis for

193 See, e.g., SV Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010),
aff ’d, 37 A.3d 205 (Del. 2011).
194 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(7), 174(a).
195 For a leading federal case applying Georgia law, see generally Munford v. Valuation
Research Corp. (In re Munford, Inc.), 97 F.3d 456 (11th Cir. 1996).
196 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 172.
197 Id. § 141(e) (providing for directors’ good faith reliance on corporation records).
198 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985) (noting that for purposes of
section 141(e), a report may be relied upon only if it is “pertinent to the subject matter upon which
a board is called to act, and otherwise . . . entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance”), overruled
in part on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009); see also Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1988) (warning that a board employing good faith
reliance nevertheless has an “active and direct duty of oversight” in significant matters, including
sales of control).
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concluding that the post-LBO company would be solvent before approving
a transaction that could or would be viewed as a share repurchase. In
practice, this could be achieved by requiring a credible solvency opinion
from Target’s investment banker prior to approving the LBO, as is done in
the United Kingdom.
b. Theory II: Dividends and Reductions-in-Capital
Share repurchases are just one of the ways in which managers may
“shovel all the assets in the corporate treasury out to the shareholders when
the corporation has insufficient assets to pay its creditors or when the
shareholder distribution renders the corporation unable to pay its creditors.”199 It can also be done by dividend or reduction of capital. Because the
effects on creditors are the same, the restrictions are largely the same.200
i. The Analysis Under DGCL Section 174
Under sections 170 and 173, dividends may only be paid out of surplus or
net profits.201 As noted above, “surplus” is defined by subtracting “stated
capital” and liabilities from assets. “Net profits” is a rather obscure concept,
and dividends out of net profits are subject to limitations.202 The idea is
clear enough: even when the firm has had years of losses and no surplus, it
may be necessary to promise dividends to attract new capital. The “net
profits” provision makes it possible to pay dividends in those circumstances.
But how, exactly, to interpret this provision is quite problematic.203

199
200

MANNING, supra note 154, at 63.
This is why the Model Business Corporation Act treats distributions to shareholders in a
unitary fashion. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.40, 8.33 & cmt. (2008); BLACK, supra note 179,
§§ 1:3, 6:4.
201 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 170, 173.
202 In particular, section 170 provides
If the capital of the corporation, computed in accordance with §§ 154 and 244 of this
title, shall have been diminished by depreciation in the value of its property, or by
losses, or otherwise, to an amount less than the aggregate amount of the capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon
the distribution of assets, the directors of such corporation shall not declare and pay
out of such net profits any dividends upon any shares of any classes of its capital
stock until the deficiency in the amount of capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets shall
have been repaired.
Id. § 170(a).
203 MANNING, supra note 154, at 82-84.
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In the hypothetical LBO described earlier, the amounts distributed to
shareholders are sufficiently large—and destructive of the firm’s solvency—
that if the distribution is viewed as a dividend, it would likely be held to
exceed even the most flexible interpretation of sections 170 and 173. Moreover,
as with share repurchases, so too here there seems to be a principle that a
firm cannot pay a dividend if it “diminishes the ability of the company to
pay its debts, or lessens the security of its creditors.”204
The rest of the analysis follows the previous discussion. Under section 174,
directors are personally liable for willful or negligent violation of section
173.205 Under section 102(b)(7), this violation is understood to be a breach of
fiduciary duty that cannot be exculpated.206 Finally, for there to be a defense
under section 172, reliance must be reasonable and in good faith.207 A dividend analysis thus does not add much to the share repurchase analysis.
ii. The Relevance of the Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance
A predictable response to the illegal stock repurchase and illegal dividend theories is appeal to the so-called “doctrine of independent legal
significance” (ILS). Does the fact that my hypothetical transaction is
structured as a merger insulate it from challenge as a stock repurchase or
dividend? Historically, the ILS doctrine emerged out of the 1930s and firms’
inability to raise new capital due to accrued preferred stock dividends that
made it impossible to promise dividends on new common stock. 208 In
Federal United Corp. v. Havender, the Delaware Supreme Court authorized
the use of a merger with a wholly owned subsidiary in which the old
preferred and its arrearages were cancelled and replaced by new preferred in
the merged entity and some common stock.209 Although one could view the
use of the merger provision as an evasion of the limitation imposed on
charter amendments, the court instead took the position that “[t]here is a
clear distinction between the situations recognized by the General Law and
the modes of procedure applicable to each of them . . . .”210
204
205
206
207
208

In re Int’l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 255 (Del. Ch. 1914).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174.
Id. § 102(b)(7).
Id. § 172.
For a concise historical summary, see WILLIAM J. CARNEY, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 109-10 (3d ed. 2011). For a more comprehensive treatment, see generally
C. Stephen Bigler & Blake Rohrbacher, Form or Substance? The Past, Present, and Future of the
Doctrine of Independent Legal Significance, 63 BUS. LAW. 1 (2007).
209 11 A.2d 331, 333-43 (Del. 1940).
210 Id. at 342.
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This approach later became known as the “doctrine of independent legal
significance.”211 In the area of preferred stock, it has been clear ever since
that changes to preferred stock rights and preferences (which are part of the
corporate charter) can be made either by charter amendment (in which case
there is a class vote provided by statute212) or by merger (in which case there
is no class vote by statute unless specifically included in the certificate of
designations213). This longstanding interpretation of the statute eventually
morphed into a rule of contract interpretation, with courts interpreting the
certificate of designations—the contract between preferred stockholders and
the firm—as only providing for a class vote in mergers when specifically
mentioned.214
The ILS doctrine spread from the preferred stock context to a more
general interpretation of sections 251 and 271.215 The Delaware courts have
consistently held that a transaction structured as a sale of all or substantially
all of a company’s assets under section 271, which complies with the procedural requirements of that section, cannot be attacked as invalid for not also
complying with the procedural requirements of the merger statute (section
251), even if the resulting arrangement of corporate assets is identical to the
result of a merger.216 The reverse is also true: a statutory merger does not
constitute a sale of assets and thus need not comply with the procedural
requirements of section 271.217 This same approach has been extended to
purchases of stock for stock, and Delaware courts have consistently held
that, although the outcome is identical to a section 251 merger, a transaction

211
212
213
214

See, e.g., Langfelder v. Universal Labs., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Del. 1946).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242.
See id. § 251.
See, e.g., Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984) (“Preferential rights are contractual in nature and therefore are governed by the express provisions of a
company’s certificate of incorporation. . . . [They] must also be clearly expressed and will not be
presumed.”). See generally Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. 19719, 2002 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 90 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), aff ’d sub nom. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper
Fin. Corp., No. 680, 2003 Del. LEXIS 237 (Del. April 16, 2003); Warner Commc’ns Inc. v. ChrisCraft Indus., Inc., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum, No. 7899, 1985
Del. Ch. LEXIS 459 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985). For a description of the shift from a rule of
statutory interpretation to a rule of statutory and contract interpretation, see D. Gordon Smith,
Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 837-40 (2004).
215 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 271.
216 See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1963).
217 See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 113-14 (Del. 1952).
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structured as an exchange of stock need not comply with section 251 procedures.218
By placing the form of the transaction over its substance, the ILS doctrine has made an attractive shield against challenges. Although some might
view ILS as a judicial wild card to be played when judges choose not to
intervene for other reasons, there are clear doctrinal limits to its scope.219
First, far from being a wild card, it has a narrow procedural focus. When the
Delaware legislature came to codify it in the limited partnership context in
2009, it provided: “Action validly taken pursuant to 1 provision of this
chapter shall not be deemed invalid solely because it is identical or similar
in substance to an action that could have been taken pursuant to some other
provision of this chapter . . . .”220
Second, from the beginning, it has been clear that ILS relates to challenges by preferred and common stockholders and not to creditor interests.
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court has explicitly embraced the “de facto
merger doctrine”—the doctrinal antithesis to ILS—to protect creditors.221
The third limitation on the scope of ILS is the distinction drawn in
Delaware jurisprudence between “legal” and “equitable” claims, a distinction
that finds expression in the famous and oft-cited language from Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.: “[I]nequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”222 This two-level analysis has led
Delaware courts, in appropriate circumstances, to recharacterize transactions to protect vulnerable parties. Thus, for example, in Gatz v. Ponsoldt,
the Delaware Supreme Court relied on tax law’s “step transaction” doctrine
to recharacterize a complicated series of transactions that effected a “recapitalization.”223 This approach has figured in more recent Chancery Court
opinions such as LAMPERS v. Crawford, in which Chancellor Chandler
218 See, e.g., Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 377-78 (Del. 1963); Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d
1089, 1097-99 (Del. Ch. 1983), aff ’d, 467 A.2d 1274 (Del. 1983); Fidanque v. Am. Maracaibo Co., 92
A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1952).
219 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 214, at 848 (“The doctrine of independent legal significance is a
rule of judicial abstention.”).
220 Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 171101(h) (Supp. 2012).
221 See, e.g., Orzeck, 195 A.2d at 378 (“We do not intend to be understood as holding that the
doctrine of de facto merger is not recognized in Delaware. Such is not the case for it has been
recognized in cases of sales of assets for the protection of creditors or stockholders who have
suffered an injury by reason of failure to comply with the statute governing such sales.”).
222 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). For a classic analysis, see Chancellor Allen’s opinion in
SICPA Holding S.A. v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc., No. 15129, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 6, 1997).
223 925 A.2d 1265, 1280-81 & n.31 (Del. 2007).
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rejected an ILS argument and relied upon the step transaction doctrine to
recharacterize a cash dividend, designed to be payable only upon the effective
date of a stock-for-stock merger, as part of the merger consideration and
therefore triggering appraisal rights.224
The hypothetical LBO could be collapsed under any version of the step
transaction doctrine, as each step is dependent on the simultaneous execution of the others, with everything closing simultaneously.
c. Theory III: Would Approving the LBO Breach the Directors’ Duty of Loyalty?
The principles that underlie the share repurchase and dividend theories
may provide the grounds for a more general fiduciary duty account. Indeed,
as discussed in more detail below, when one takes seriously the reemergence
of the shareholder–creditor agency cost problem, it may be that directors’
understanding of their role should return from the contemporary exhortation to maximize equity value to the traditional goal of maximizing firm
value. Given the role that fiduciary duty law plays in educating directors as
to their duties,225 focusing on the duty of loyalty may be a useful strategy
for reorienting directors.
Traditional Delaware corporate law principles are instructive here. First,
Delaware corporate law cases often state that the directors owe fiduciary
duties to “the corporation” or to “the corporation and its stockholders.”226
But this latter formulation is somewhat misleading, as is illustrated by cases
in which stockholders have conflicting interests. In those situations, directors
may take whatever action best serves the corporation or the entire body of
stockholders.227 It is thus more accurate to say, in accord with the traditional

224 918 A.2d 1171, 1191-92 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Noddings Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Capstar
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16538, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 56, at *24-25 (Del. Ch. Mar. 24, 1999) (relying
on the step transaction doctrine to combine two transactions in order to analyze them as one under
a warrant agreement), aff ’d, No. 165, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 324 (Del. Sept. 22, 1999).
225 Rock, supra note 176, at 1106.
226 See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“While technically not trustees, [corporate officers and directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.”); see
also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“[D]irectors are charged with an
unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.”), overruled in part by Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). For a sampling of citations, see E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 764 n.8 (2008).
227 See 2 EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2 (5th ed. Supp. 2012) (citing cases).
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position, that directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, for the benefit
of the shareholders as a group (not “and to the shareholders”).228
Second, it is well accepted that when a firm is insolvent, directors owe
fiduciary duties to the creditors.229 Again, a more precise description would
be that the duties still run to the corporation but now for the benefit of the
creditors.230
The traditional doctrine thus draws a line at the solvency–insolvency
boundary. This, of course, raises the question of what happens as one
approaches that line. As Chancellor Allen noted in his famous Credit
Lyonnais opinion, shareholder incentives become distorted as the firm enters
the “vicinity of insolvency”: “The possibility of insolvency can do curious
things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior
and creating complexities for directors.”231 Indeed, this distortion of shareholder incentives is offered as an explanation for why, “[a]t least where a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is
not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the
corporate enterprise.” 232 Chancellor Allen’s point here is, among other
things, that the traditional view of the board’s duty as running to the
corporation, and not directly to the shareholders, allows for the appropriate
adjustment as the firm approaches insolvency, and that the board must be

228 See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Shareholders as Principals, in KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN
CORPORATE LAW AND TRUSTS LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HAROLD FORD 105
(Ian Ramsay ed., 2002); see also Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 1074 n.4 (1983) (noting that management and
directors owe duties to the stockholders generally, and not to individual or group holders); Paula J.
Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J.
301, 308-14 (2008) (exploring the legal contours of the fiduciary–stockholder relationship).
229 Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992)), overruled in part on other grounds
by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
230 This principle is confirmed by the related procedural rules on standing to bring an action
for breach of these fiduciary duties. Consider a claim that the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty
has harmed the corporation. When a firm is solvent, shareholders may bring a derivative suit, and
must satisfy its requirements, “because they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation’s
growth and increased value.” Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101. When a firm is insolvent, the creditors
are eligible to bring a derivative suit because they become “the residual beneficiaries of any
increase in value,” id., although they too must satisfy (as yet largely undeveloped) procedural
requirements.
Note, of course, that in either case—whether the firm is solvent or insolvent—the corporation
itself may bring a suit against an officer or director for breach of fiduciary duty.
231 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
232 Id. at *108.
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allowed to take creditor interests into account. Thus, when a firm approaches
insolvency, independent directors acting in good faith will be shielded from
liability when they act in the interests of the corporate entity, even if their
actions do not maximize shareholder value.233
Henry Hu and Jay Westbrook reject this traditional way of thinking
about fiduciary duties, arguing that it “is inconsistent with new financial
learning and muddles the analysis of risk taking.”234 Instead, they argue for a
strong form of the “no multiple masters” thesis—namely, that there should
be no creditor-regarding duties so long as the corporation has not filed for
bankruptcy because (a) maximizing corporate value will conflict with
maximizing shareholder value, especially as the corporation encounters
financial distress; and (b) when the corporation does encounter distress, the
board should maximize shareholder value.235 This is because
the investment risk taking that would be optimal from the corporation’s
standpoint—or from the managers’ or creditors’ standpoint—differs radically
from shareholder-optimal risk taking. Simply put, risk taking that is optimal
for the corporate entity itself (and most managers and creditors) is likely to
be too cowardly from the standpoint of well-diversified shareholders.236

Hu and Westbrook’s argument is important because it recognizes the
implications of a shareholder-value-maximization approach to director
fiduciary duties. They are right that shareholder value and corporate value
can, and will, diverge, especially as the firm encounters financial distress.
They are also correct that shifting fiduciary duties as the firm becomes
insolvent may somewhat undermine accountability. And finally, on their
approach, the hypothetical is easily resolved: the board should approve the
LBO, even when it knows that doing so will render the firm insolvent.
As we continue to dig out from the 2008 meltdown and reckon with the
enormous social costs of financial distress, this 2007 view seems otherworldly.
By embracing what seems to me to be a reductio ad absurdum, Hu and
Westbrook approach a form of equity fetishism—maximizing equity value
for its own sake and not as a tool for building valuable firms. By contrast,
the traditional corporate law exhortation to maximize firm value is a very

233 See, e.g., Prod. Res. Grp., 863 A.2d at 788 (noting the shield Credit Lyonnais provided for
directors to pay the company’s bills “as a first priority”).
234 Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1359 (2007).
235 Id. at 1357.
236 Id.; see also id. at 1378 (“The overall effect is to exacerbate management’s aversion to risk
and encourage excessive worry about the corporate entity’s success or failure.”).
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useful reminder that doing so—and not maximizing shareholder value—is
what corporate law is, and should be, about.
i. Was the Board’s Decision in the Best Interest of the Corporation?
Let us now return to the opening hypothetical: suppose the board is
confronted with an LBO that will render the firm insolvent. If we take a
traditional “entity” view that the board of directors owes its fiduciary duty
to the corporation—and resist the now conventional identification of the
corporation with the shareholders—would proceeding with the transaction
be in the best interest of the corporation? From that perspective, the board
must consider both the potential benefits and the potential harms of the
decision to the corporation. When the transaction at issue is an LBO that,
as in our hypothetical, will render the firm insolvent, the analysis is surprisingly straightforward and unequivocal.
Consider, first, the harm to the corporation: financial distress and bankruptcy. While obviously fact-specific, studies indicate that bankruptcy is
costly to firms, with direct costs of around 3% and total costs of 20% to 30%
of firm value.237
What is the benefit to the corporation of the hypothetical LBO? There
would seem to be little or none. From a finance perspective, the main
potential corporate benefit from an LBO is increased efficiency, driven by
the disciplining effect of debt: managers are more likely to make hard
choices (e.g., closing plants) if they must do so in order to avoid bankruptcy.238 That benefit, however, is lost if, as in the hypothetical, the LBO
itself renders the firm insolvent. When that happens, the benefits of the
transaction all flow to the shareholders.239

237 See Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39
J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984) (finding, from a small sample, that costs can exceed 20% but, on average,
comprise 11% to 17% of firm value); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial
(Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J.
FIN. 1443, 1463 (1998) (finding total costs to be 10% to 20% of firm value); Lawrence A. Weiss,
Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 299
(1990) (finding direct costs around 3%).
238 Jensen, supra note 21, at 324.
239 See Steven Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation’s Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 671-72 (1996) (“Because a solvent corporation has a fiduciary duty to creditors only
where its action would cause insolvency, the term vicinity of insolvency should, therefore, only
mean . . . that insolvency is one of the reasonably expected outcomes. Perhaps a better term for
vicinity of insolvency therefore should be ‘contingent insolvency.’” (footnotes omitted)).
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ii. Would the Directors’ Breach of Fiduciary Duty Be Exculpated?
To complete the corporate law analysis, we need to consider what sort of
breach of fiduciary duty is being alleged and whether directors would be
exculpated under a DGCL section 102(b)(7) charter provision. Because such
provisions are pervasive, the claim would have to be pled as a breach of the
duty of loyalty. Does it fit?
Part of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is the duty to act in good faith.240
Moreover, section 102(b)(7) explicitly precludes exculpation for actions not
in good faith.241 How does Delaware understand “good faith”? The analysis
most relevant to the hypothetical is the Chancery Court’s in In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, a case arising out of the dreadful decision to
hire Michael Ovitz and his $140 million termination payment.242 Chancellor
Chandler held that allegations that directors “consciously and intentionally
disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’
attitude concerning a material corporate decision,” adequately alleged a
breach of the duty of good faith.243 The allegations implied that the directors “knew that they were making material decisions without adequate
information and without adequate deliberation, and that they simply did
not care if the decisions caused the corporation and its stockholders to suffer
injury or loss.”244
Chancellor Chandler, in language specifically approved by the Delaware
Supreme Court, elaborated on the concept of bad faith. He explained that
bad faith may be shown
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts
with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties.245

240 See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[A]
director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her
actions are in the corporation’s best interest.” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34
(Del. Ch. 2003))); see generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010).
241 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
242 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (ruling on the motion to dismiss).
243 Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
244 Id. (emphasis omitted).
245 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (post-trial
opinion) (footnotes omitted), aff ’d, Brehm v. Eisner (In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.),
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The Delaware Supreme Court quoted the language above in Brehm, 906
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In order to obtain a ruling under this standard that the officers’ or directors’
actions breached the duty of loyalty, one would have to argue that, in singlemindedly focusing on maximizing shareholder value and acting with indifference to the corporation’s insolvency risk, they adopted a “‘we don’t care
about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate decision.”246 What
strengthens the claim is that, in the hypothetical LBO, not one penny of the
proceeds goes into firm projects. Instead, all the money raised by borrowing
against firm assets was paid out to the pre-LBO shareholders and in fees.
From the corporation’s perspective, this could be viewed as the sort of “no
win” proposition that provides strong evidence of a lack of good faith.247
As noted above, it is precisely this aspect of the traditional understanding of fiduciary duties to which Hu and Westbrook object.248 When, as in
the hypothetical, there is a clear conflict between what is good for the
corporation and what is good for the shareholders, Hu and Westbrook view
acting in the interests of the corporation as a form of cowardice. Alternatively stated, the traditional view that the duty of loyalty runs to the
corporation, if directors understand and internalize it, can orient directors
when insolvency looms and the normal assumption that what is good for the
shareholders is good for the corporation breaks down.
iii. The Fit with the Delaware “Zone of Insolvency” Cases
How does this “fiduciary duty” theory fit with the Delaware cases on the
duties of directors “in the zone of insolvency”? The canon is quite compact
and well-known: Credit Lyonnais,249 Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT
Group, Inc.,250 Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,251 and
North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla. 252 No Delaware case directly addresses the question of directors’
duties when the decision itself renders the firm insolvent.
A.2d at 67, and Stone, 911 A.2d at 369. The fact that defendants prevailed after a six-week trial
does not affect the validity of the Chancellor’s articulation of the legal rule.
246 In re Disney, 825 A.2d at 289 (emphasis added).
247 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 896 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing a “no-win” situation that
led to allegations of lack of good faith).
248 See supra text accompanying notes 234-236.
249 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
250 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in part by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
251 906 A.2d 168, 174 (Del. Ch. 2006), aff ’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931
A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
252 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007).
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The Credit Lyonnais case arose out of the failed LBO of MGM by
Giancarlo Parretti. Credit Lyonnais had financed MGM’s escape from
bankruptcy and had received governance rights.253 After a trial, the court
concluded that Parretti had breached his agreements and that Credit
Lyonnais was entitled to exercise its rights to remove him and his associates
from the MGM board of directors.254 In the course of considering Parretti’s
claim that the bank and the management team breached a fiduciary duty of
good faith and fair dealing owed to Parretti by “failing to facilitate sale
transactions that Parretti sought in order to help him regain control,” the
court found that the “management group acted prudently with respect to
these transactions from the point of view of MGM.”255 The case, however, is
mainly remembered for Chancellor Allen’s provocative obiter dicta exploring the divergence of equity and enterprise incentives in the “zone of
insolvency.”256
Production Resources arose out of an attempt to collect a debt.257 Because
the defendant, NCT, a limited liability company, continued operating even
though it seemed to be insolvent, the plaintiff, PRG, a creditor, sought to
protect its interests by appointing a receiver under DGCL section 291.258
PRG also alleged a breach of fiduciary duty against the NCT board, and,
moreover, argued that because NCT was insolvent, PRG should be able to
bring a direct claim, rather than having to satisfy the requirements for a
derivative claim.259
The court granted the plaintiff ’s demand for appointment of a receiver.260
With respect to the fiduciary duty claims, the issue was whether the claims
were derivative or direct. PRG conceded that the claims would have been
derivative had the company been solvent because they were based on injury
to the corporation.261 But, PRG claimed, once the company became insolvent, the claims should become direct claims in the hands of the creditors.262
Not surprisingly, the court rejected this argument and held that claims that
are derivative in a solvent company remain derivative in an insolvent

253
254
255
256
257

Credit Lyonnais, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *7-9.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *107-08.
Id. at *108 n.55.
Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 774 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in
part by N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007).
258 Id. at 774-75.
259 Id. at 775.
260 Id. at 775-76.
261 Id. at 776.
262 Id.
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company.263 Because neither party briefed the procedural issues that arise
once the claim is characterized as derivative (e.g., whether demand by
creditors is required), the court left those issues for another day.264
In the course of this analysis, then–Vice Chancellor Strine included a
wide-ranging discussion that tried to make sense of and bring order to the
literature on Credit Lyonnais, with a clear suggestion, again in dictum, that
“Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who
claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk so long as
the company would not technically breach any legal obligations.”265 The
implication, of course, is that Credit Lyonnais did not provide creditors with
a sword.
Trenwick arose out of the failure of a multinational insurance group.266
The case was brought by a litigation trust that emerged from the reorganization of the top U.S. subsidiary with the authority to bring claims belonging
to the subsidiary (but not, according to the court, the subsidiary’s creditors’
claims).267 It brought claims against the parent company, alleging a variety
of violations including breach of fiduciary duty, and against the directors of
the subsidiary, alleging breach of the duties of care and loyalty.268
In the course of wrestling with (and ultimately dismissing) what seems
to have been a badly drafted complaint, Chancellor Strine suggested, again
in dictum, that directors of a wholly owned subsidiary may “owe a duty to
the subsidiary not to take action benefiting a parent corporation that they
know will render the subsidiary unable to meet its legal obligations.”269
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v.
Gheewalla, the most recent opinion bearing on directors’ duties to creditors,
the Delaware Supreme Court addressed the issue of creditor standing. 270
The court squarely rejected plaintiffs’ claim that creditors should have direct
standing to bring fiduciary duty claims against directors when the corporation is either in the “zone of insolvency” or insolvent.271 Rather, the court

263
264
265
266

Id.
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 788.
Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 172 (Del. Ch. 2006),
aff ’d sub nom. Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Billett, 931 A.2d 438 (Del. 2007).
267 Id. at 172-73. Insurance companies, like banks, are exempt from federal bankruptcy law
and have a specialized insolvency regime.
268 Id. at 172-74.
269 Id. at 203.
270 930 A.2d 92, 94 (Del. 2007).
271 Id. at 103.
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held, a claim that is derivative when the firm is solvent remains derivative
when it becomes insolvent.272
As this quick review shows, Delaware has yet to address the key issue in
my hypothetical, although there is supportive language in Trenwick, quoted
above.
d. Theory IV: Directors’ Duty to Obey the Law?
In the hypothetical, if the transaction went forward, the LBO could well
be viewed as a fraudulent transfer, as discussed above. Indeed, the hypothetical contains suggestions of fraud:
In the course of the sale process, [senior managers] have directed the preparation of new projections that, to an impartial eye, would be found to be
wildly optimistic or even fraudulent. The board knows that the juiced projections were prepared for the marketing effort, that they have minimal
foundation, and that the buyers and their financing banks have been relying
upon them without realizing just how juiced they are.273

Would directors, in knowingly approving an LBO that would constitute a
fraudulent transfer, or knowingly presenting fraudulent projections, violate
their “fiduciary duty to obey the law,” and thereby breach their duty of
loyalty?
Is there such a duty and, if so, what is its scope? In German corporate
law, this is known as the “duty to legality.”274 The ALI Principles of Corporate Governance explicitly limit profit maximization and shareholder gain:
“Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the
corporation, in the conduct of its business: (1) Is obliged, to the same extent
as a natural person, to act within the boundaries set by law.”275 Section 4.01
272 Id. Even though the holding of the case is quite narrow and technical, the case has been
read as rejecting any fiduciary duties for the benefit of creditors in the zone of insolvency. This
reading is largely based on the statement in Gheewalla that

[w]hen a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for
Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their business
judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its shareholder
owners.
Id. at 101. This statement is clearly dictum. Moreover, it does not address the core issue raised by
“wrongful trading” theories—namely, actions taken that threaten to render the company insolvent.
273 See supra Section IV.A.
274 Florian M. Reinhart, The Director’s and Officer’s Duty to Legality? 2-4 & n.4 (Jan. 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
275 ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1992).
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states that a “director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director’s or officer’s functions in good faith.”276 The comments make clear
that “a director or officer violates the duty to perform his or her functions in
good faith if he or she knowingly causes the corporation to disobey the
law.” 277 Similarly, DGCL section 102(b)(7) precludes exculpation for “a
knowing violation of law.”278
Chancellor Strine has been particularly attentive to the “duty to legality”
aspect of the duty of loyalty. As he stated in In re Massey Energy:
Delaware law does not charter law breakers. Delaware law allows corporations to pursue diverse means to make a profit, subject to a critical statutory
floor, which is the requirement that Delaware corporations only pursue
“lawful business” by “lawful acts.” As a result, a fiduciary of a Delaware corporation cannot be loyal to a Delaware corporation by knowingly causing it
to seek profit by violating the law.279

What is the scope and content of this duty in Delaware law?280 Does it
apply to all obligations of the corporation, including “private law” obligations to contracting parties, or is it limited to “public law” obligation? And,
if limited to public law obligations, on which side of the private–public line
does fraudulent conveyance fall?
The case law articulating the “duty to legality” seems to focus on public
law obligations such as campaign finance laws,281 bribery,282 price fixing,283
mine safety regulations,284 off-label marketing of prescription drugs,285 and

276
277
278
279

Id. § 4.01.
Id. § 4.01(a) cmt. d.
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 83, at *73-74 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (footnotes omitted). For similar statements by
Chancellor Strine, see Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007); Prod. Res.
Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 n.52 (Del. Ch. 2004), overruled in part by N.
Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007); Metro
Commc'n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs. Inc., 854 A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004).
Vice Chancellor Laster has recently added his voice. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46
A.3d 313, 352 (Del. Ch. 2012).
280 For a review of the case law, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate
Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 34-38 (2006).
281 Miller v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974).
282 Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1909).
283 Plate v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 275 Cal. Rptr. 667, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
284 In re Massey Energy, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *74.
285 La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 353 (Del. Ch. 2012).
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unfair labor practices.286 Chancellor Strine, in law review mode, likewise
seems to focus on public law obligations.287
Assuming, then, that the “duty to legality” is in fact limited to public
law obligations (criminal and regulatory) and does not impose a duty not to
breach contracts of the corporation, how are fraud and fraudulent conveyance to be understood? To the extent that the hypothetical presents a
credible claim of fraud, it would seem to fit comfortably within the existing
doctrine. As Vice Chancellor Laster has noted, “Corporate misconduct
involving fraud or illegality presents a different situation. Even under a
pure Caremark monitoring theory . . . .”288
But what about knowingly approving a transaction that will constitute a
fraudulent conveyance? Is fraudulent conveyance law “public” or “private”?
In In re Cybergenics, the Third Circuit considered whether fraudulent
conveyance claims in failed LBOs belong to the debtor (and thus were sold
when all the assets of the debtor were sold) or to the creditors (and thus
could be pursued for their benefit by a trustee, by the debtor in possession
acting as a trustee or directly).289 In reaching the conclusion that fraudulent
conveyance claims belong to the creditors, not the bankrupt corporation,
Judge Rendell emphasized the extent to which fraudulent conveyance
protects the “transferor’s creditors, whose efforts to collect their debts have
essentially been thwarted as a consequence of the transferor’s actions.”290 In
emphasizing fraudulent conveyance’s roots in fraud (or even criminal
law),291 the Third Circuit, in effect, located fraudulent conveyance claims on
the public side of the line. By contrast, in the context of determining the
scope of permissible bankruptcy jurisdiction and the limits imposed by the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
286
287
288

Abrams v. Allen, 74 N.E.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. 1947).
Strine, et al., supra note 240, at 652 n.69 (citing cases).
Pyott, 46 A.3d at 352 (referring to In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
289 See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery (In re
Cybergenics Corp.), 226 F.3d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 2000).
290 Id. at 241 (emphasis removed). But see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 555-69 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(vacating the panel decision and wrestling with the question whether the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1 (2000), precludes
derivative creditor standing to assert fraudulent conveyance claims). See generally Nancy Haller,
Comment, Cybergenics II: Precedent and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365 (2004)
(evaluating the Third Circuit’s en banc decision).
291 In re Cybergenics, 226 F.3d at 242 (citing Barry L. Zaretsky, The Fraudulent Transfer Law
as the Arbiter of Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168-71 (1995), as “explaining that
fraudulent transfer law started as part creditor protection and part criminal law, but evolved into a
law primarily for creditor protection”).
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Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, viewed fraudulent conveyance actions
brought for the purpose of augmenting the estate against parties who have
not submitted claims as “quintessentially suits at common law that more
nearly resemble state-law contract claims” and thus “appear [to be] matters
of private rather than public right.”292
If the “fraud” aspects of fraudulent conveyance are sufficient to put it on
the “public law” side, then knowingly approving an LBO that is a fraudulent
conveyance, like knowingly approving corporate action to defraud a third
party, would breach directors’ duty of loyalty, even if selling the company
for a sky-high price benefited shareholders.
B. Shareholder Opportunism in Complex Corporate Structures:
the Dynegy Battle
The recent battle at Dynegy Inc. between shareholders and their loyal
managers versus creditors provides a good context for better understanding
the structure of actual conflicts and how they can be controlled. The
Dynegy fight involves complex financial structures nested in a holding
company structure with numerous layers of subsidiaries. Because such
complexity plays a large role in the waging and controlling of current
battles, it deserves closer attention.
Dynegy is in the wholesale power business.293 As of the end of 2010, it
owned seventeen electric power plants in six states.294 Like many public
corporations, Dynegy is, in fact, a group of companies, with the publicly
held parent, Dynegy Inc., nothing more than a holding company at the top
of a complex pyramid.295 As we will see, this common structure presents a
variety of possibilities for shareholders to extract value from creditors.
The chart in Figure 3 is a simplified view of Dynegy before its August
2011 restructuring. Publicly held Dynegy Inc. owns all of the shares of

292 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989); accord Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011) (applying
Granfinanciera in determining the scope of bankruptcy court jurisdiction and the limits imposed by
Article III of the U.S. Constitution).
293 Dynegy’s power plants largely sell power on the wholesale energy markets operated by
regional Independent System Operators (ISO), such as NYISO, or Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTO). See Report of Susheel Kirpalani, Examiner 19, In re Dynegy Holdings,
L.L.C., No. 11-38111 (CGM), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Dynegy Examiner
Report]. ISOs and RTOs typically operate regional electricity grids, administer a region's
wholesale electricity markets, and provide reliability planning for the region's bulk electricity
system.
294 Id. at 20.
295 Id. at 22.
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Dynegy Holdings, Inc. (DHI), which itself holds the shares of lower-level
holding companies. The ultimate operating companies are at the bottom of
the chart, five layers below the publicly owned parent.296
Figure 3297

Why do firms adopt a structure with numerous wholly owned subsidiaries and subsidiaries of subsidiaries?298 There are a variety of reasons.299 In
some cases, the structure is adopted because the limited liability of the
corporate form allows liabilities of subsidiaries to be contained. Sometimes
it is necessary in order to do business in a foreign jurisdiction that bars
branches or divisions of foreign firms. Sometimes it is necessary or useful in
satisfying local regulatory requirements (e.g., licenses or, in the case of
regulated utilities, the public utilities commission). Sometimes it is adopted
because selling or buying a subsidiary is far easier than selling or buying
296
297
298

Id.
Id. at 21.
According to Richard Squire, the 100 largest U.S. public companies (by revenue) in 2010
reported an average of 245 major subsidiaries, with a median of 114. Richard Squire, Strategic
Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (2011).
299 For prominent contributions to this literature, see Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 621-22
(1975); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499,
507-09, 516-17 (1976); Robert J. Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent
Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 235 & n.1 (1976). See generally Squire, supra
note 298.
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specific assets: a firm decides to acquire another firm and knows that
someday it may wish to sell it. And sometimes the structure is adopted to
facilitate financing: it allows the pledging of particular cash flows to repay
debt taken on the security of specified assets. As we will see, although
company structure raises few classic shareholder issues (at least when the
subsidiaries are all wholly owned and solvent), it can raise a variety of
shareholder–creditor issues.
In the case of Dynegy, most of the public debt was issued by the toplevel subsidiary, DHI, with the cash flows necessary to pay bondholders
coming through dividends from the lower level operating subsidiaries (as
DHI itself has no operations).300 DHI also had bank debt and lease guaranty
obligations. As of July 30, 2011, DHI had approximately $1.5 billion in bank
debt, $3.5 billion in public bond debt, and $550 million in lease obligations.
Although the bank debt contained a variety of affirmative and negative
covenants and events of default, the bond debt was largely “covenant lite.”
DHI’s bond debt was not guaranteed by Dynegy or by the DHI subsidiaries. The main protective covenant restricted DHI and its subsidiaries from
granting liens unless the DHI senior notes were secured on equivalent
terms as the new secured debt. Importantly, there were no covenants
restricting the transfer of DHI’s assets, or restricting dividends from DHI,
or financial tests such as EBITDA ratios.
Moving down the corporate structure, one arrives at the Roseton and
Danskammer facilities—formerly of Central Hudson Gas—that Dynegy
acquired in 2001 using long-term financing provided by a sale-leaseback
transaction.301 In particular, four of the six power plants comprising those
facilities were sold in an asset-backed sale-leaseback transaction with
Danskammer O.L. L.L.C. and Roseton O.L. L.L.C., subsidiaries of PSEG.
Dynegy subsidiaries Dynegy Danskammer and Dynegy Roseton became
lessees under leases that expire in 2031 and 2035, respectively. The transaction was financed by a combination of equity and pass-through trust certificates issued by the PSEG entities and secured by a mortgage on the
underlying power plants. DHI guaranteed the lease payments and performance obligations, with restrictions against DHI selling all or substantially
all of its assets, with the acquirer, in such a case, being obligated to assume

300 For the following discussion on Dynegy’s public debt structure, see Dynegy Examiner
Report, supra note 293, at 22-25.
301 For the following discussion on Dynegy’s lease guaranties, see id. at 24.
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the guarantee (the “successor obligor” clause).302 Below is the examiner’s
graphic showing the financing structure.
Figure 4303

Then financial disaster struck. The price of electrical energy crashed,
driven by a collapse in natural gas prices and reduced demand due to the
economic slowdown.304 The Roseton and Danskammer facilities were no
longer able to generate sufficient revenues to meet their lease obligations.305
By June 2010, Dynegy’s stock had dropped to $3.85 per share.306 In August
2010, Dynegy and Blackstone entered into a merger agreement at $4.50 per
share.307 In October 2010, Seneca, a hedge fund, bought a 9.3% stake, while
Carl Icahn reported approximately 10%.308 Both Icahn and Seneca opposed
the Blackstone offer as inadequate. In November 2010, on the eve of the

302 Intragroup guarantees are very common. See Squire, supra note 298, at 606 n.2 (noting that,
in 2010, 63% of the largest U.S. companies (by revenue) reported using intragroup guaranties).
303 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 25.
304 See Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
305 See Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 71.
306 See Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 46 (Mar. 8, 2012).
307 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 26.
308 Hillary Canada, The Morning Leverage: Icahn Enters the Dynegy Ring, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/2010/10/12/the-morning-leverage-icahn-enters-the-dynegy-ring.
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shareholder vote, Blackstone increased its offer to $5.00 per share, a price
the shareholders still rejected.309
Soon thereafter, Icahn, who by now owned around 14.5%,310 announced a
tender offer for all outstanding shares at $5.50 per share.311 Seneca opposed
Icahn’s offer as still inadequate.312 In February 2011, shareholders rejected
Icahn’s tender offer.313
In the wake of two rejected acquisition proposals, Dynegy’s management
resigned and its directors announced that they would not stand for reelection.314 The board was expanded to include Icahn and Seneca nominees,
interim management was installed, and Icahn and Seneca assumed effective
control.315 At the same time, it was clear that Dynegy would breach the
covenants of its bank debt unless it restructured.316
At this point, Dynegy began to pursue a complex and audacious plan to
free value for shareholders from the claims of creditors. It proceeded in
several phases.317 The first step was to reorganize the operating subsidiaries
so that the coal-fired generating facilities would be held by Dynegy Midwest Generation Corp. (“CoalCo”) while the gas-fired facilities would be
held by Dynegy Power Corp. (“GasCo”). These two new entities would be
indirect wholly owned subsidiaries of DHI and structured as “bankruptcy
remote” entities with limits on the dividends that could be paid. A new
credit facility, to replace DHI’s old credit facility that was approaching
default, would be arranged, using GasCo and CoalCo as collateral.318 The
unprofitable Danskammer and Roseton facilities would be left behind.
PSEG, the counterparty in the Danskammer and Roseton sale-leaseback
transaction, challenged the restructuring under the successor obligor
clause. 319 In essence, PSEG argued that the restructuring, by allowing
GasCo and CoalCo to take on additional debt for the benefit of DHI, and

309
310

Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 26.
Naureen S. Malik, Big Dynegy Holder Opposes Icahn-Backed Buyout Bid, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
20, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703886904576031632596026972.html.
311 Dynegy Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 45 (Mar. 8, 2011).
312 Malik, supra note 310.
313 Annual Report, supra note 311, at 45.
314 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 27-28.
315 Id. at 27-28, 32.
316 Id. at 33.
317 Here I follow the Examiner’s Report which, despite extensive redactions, is the most
complete description available. Id. at 49-50, 59-67.
318 Id. at 71.
319 For the following discussion on the legal challenges to the restructuring, I draw on the
Examiner’s Report. See id. at 72-83.
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by moving the valuable gas- and coal-fired facilities into bankruptcy-remote
entities while leaving the impaired Danskammer and Roseton facilities
behind, undermined the value of DHI’s guarantee of the Danskammer and
Roseton lease obligations.320
The Delaware Chancery Court rejected PSEG’s claims for several reasons. First, it held that the successor obligor clause, by its terms, only bound
DHI and not the DHI subsidiaries, in contrast to other provisions that
applied to both DHI and its “Principal Subsidiary.”321 Because the restructuring did not involve the transfer of all or substantially all of DHI’s
assets—namely, the stock that it held in lower-level holding companies—it
did not violate the successor obligor provision.322
Second, because DHI continued indirectly to own 100% of GasCo and
CoalCo, the reorganization did not transfer any assets away from its ultimate ownership.323 DHI, according to the defendants and to the Chancery
Court, would continue to hold all of the power plants it held before, so the
guaranty would be no less secure.324
Finally, the court rejected PSEG’s claim that transferring the valuable
generating facilities away from Danskammer and Roseton constituted a
fraudulent conveyance. According to the court, the transfer was not a
fraudulent conveyance because: (1) it was not a transfer (because the assets
remained indirectly owned); (2) DHI did not receive less than equivalent
value (for the same reason); and (3) plaintiff could not establish that DHI
was or would be rendered insolvent by the transfer.325 Indeed, the court
pointed out, the reorganization would allow DHI to replace its old credit
facility, avoid default, and extend the maturity of the senior secured debt by
around four years.326
With the Chancery Court refusing to grant an injunction, the reorganization went forward, creating separate coal and gas “silos” with a new
intermediate holding company, DGI, as in Figure 5.

320
321

Id. at 72-74.
Roseton O.L., L.L.C. v. Dynegy Holdings, Inc., No. 6689-VCP, 2011 WL 3275965, at *11-13
(Del. Ch. July 29, 2011).
322 Id.
323 Id. at *11.
324 Id. at *11-12.
325 Id. at *14-17.
326 Id.
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Figure 5327

At this point, the reorganization plan moved to phase two: transferring
the CoalCo assets out from under DHI to become a subsidiary of the
publicly held parent, Dynegy Inc.328 Here, the goal seems to have been to
insulate these assets from DHI’s obligations, to preserve value for shareholders in the event of an (inevitable) DHI bankruptcy, and possibly to put
pressure on DHI bondholders to accept DHI’s exchange offer.

327
328

Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 67.
The discussion of phase two follows the Examiner’s Report. See id. at 86-95.
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As Figure 6 shows, the coal assets were transferred to Dynegy Inc. in
exchange for an “undertaking” from Dynegy Inc. to DGI, a newly formed
subsidiary of DHI.
Figure 6329

Next, Dynegy and DHI entered into an amended and restated undertaking which replaced DGI with DHI as the recipient of payments made. This
was achieved by DGI assigning the undertaking to DHI in exchange for a
note payable to DGI, as per Figure 7.

329

Id. at 84.
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Figure 7330

A key provision in the amended undertaking, inserted when it was transferred from DGI to DHI, allowed Dynegy to reduce its obligations under
the undertaking by reducing DHI’s obligations under its outstanding bonds,
including by sponsoring an exchange offer at a discount.331
On September 15, 2011, Dynegy announced an exchange offer for $1.25
billion in DHI-issued bonds. In response, DHI bondholders sought to
enjoin the exchange offer and to undo the transfer of CoalCo away from
DHI.332 The complaint, filed in the N.Y. Supreme Court against Dynegy,
DHI, overlapping Dynegy and DHI directors, and others, alleged intentional and constructive fraudulent conveyance, unlawful distribution,
unlawful dividend, and breach of fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith.333
The exchange offer failed to gain sufficient support and was terminated
on November 3, 2011.334 On November 7, 2011, DHI and other subsidiaries
(but not Dynegy Inc.) filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.335 With the
bankruptcy filing, the action moved to bankruptcy court, where an examiner,

330
331
332

Id. at 87.
Id.
Peg Brickley & Matt Wirz, Bondholders Sue Dynegy, Challenge Restructuring, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903791504576586850956560150.html.
333 Complaint at 2-3, Avenue Invs. L.P. v. Dynegy Inc., No. 652599/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept.
21, 2011).
334 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 101.
335 Mike Spector, Dynegy Files for Unusual Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2011, at B1.
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Susheel Kirpalani, a bankruptcy lawyer at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &
Sullivan, L.L.P., was appointed and asked to complete an independent
investigation of the events leading up to the bankruptcy. In a lengthy report,
Kirpalani summarized the various stages of the transaction and examined
potential claims.336 His analysis provides a very useful guide to how existing
doctrines can be employed to control shareholder opportunism.
The key transaction was the transfer of CoalCo away from DHI.
CoalCo’s cash flows were thereafter unavailable to satisfy claims of DHI
creditors, including claims under DHI’s guaranty of the Roseton and
Danskammer leases. The key question thus became whether the value of the
undertaking was reasonably equivalent to the value of CoalCo. Kirpalani
concluded that the value of the undertaking, to the extent it could be
valued, was far less than the value of CoalCo. A second key finding was that
DHI was either insolvent or rendered insolvent by the transfer of CoalCo—
a finding contested by the defendants.337
With these two factual findings, Kirpalani concluded that the transfer
constituted both an intentional and a constructive fraudulent conveyance. In
addition, he concluded that the directors of DHI, who had also worked for
Dynegy and thus faced a clear conflict of interest, breached their duty of
loyalty to DHI by considering only the interests of Dynegy and its shareholders, when their duties ran, instead, to the creditors of DHI. Finally, he
relied on a corporate law doctrine not explored above and found that the
DHI directors, by transferring the opportunity to repurchase the DHI
bonds at a discount to Dynegy in exchange for no consideration, usurped a
DHI corporate opportunity. Although claims of illegal distributions and
illegal dividends were made in the September N.Y. Supreme Court complaint,338 the examiner did not express an opinion on those claims.
A good lawyer, Kirpalani relied on a variety of alternative legal
approaches. Intentional and constructive fraudulent conveyance theories
formed an important part of Kirpalani’s analysis, but he did not stop there.
Once he concluded that there was a strong showing that DHI, the debtor,
had been (or became) insolvent at the time of the transfers, he relied on
fiduciary duty law to attack the conflict of interest of the overlapping
directors:
No rational board of directors would have transferred CoalCo to an unrelated,
third party on the terms and conditions under which DGI (and [DHI])
336 See generally Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion draws from this report. Id. at 1-11.
337 Id. at 3-5.
338 Complaint, supra note 333, at 2-3.
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transferred it. Dynegy Inc. got much better terms than any third party
would have gotten with respect to the initial Undertaking, and even better
terms in the amended version of the Undertaking.339

Had the DHI directors been independent of Dynegy and its controlling
shareholders, it would have been a somewhat harder argument to make,
although still strong.
In another way as well, the report highlights the value of deploying multiple legal approaches. Dynegy and its shareholders primarily focused on
complying with the terms of the “covenant lite” debt issued by DHI,
seemingly believing that they would be in the clear if they complied with
the terms of those contracts. And, in fact, the examiner, like the Delaware
Chancery Court, concluded that the first step of the reorganization—
rearranging the coal and gas assets separate silos and leaving the troubled
Roseton and Danskammer facilities behind—did not violate the successor
obligor clause or any other terms of the indenture.340 The examiner argued,
however, that compliance with the indenture alone is not sufficient, because
creditors of insolvent corporations have the right to avail themselves of
non-contractual protections, such as fiduciary duties, “[b]ecause, by contract, the creditors have the right to benefit from the firm’s operations until
they are fully repaid, it is they who have an interest in ensuring that the
directors comply with their traditional fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care.”341

Finally, the Dynegy dispute shows the value of the bankruptcy law
providing for the appointment of an examiner with the power to investigate,
make findings, and act as a mediator.342 The examiner’s report was issued on
March 9, 2012.343 On March 12, the bankruptcy court ordered mediation
under the supervision of the examiner in his role as plan mediator.344 On
March 20, 2012, defendants filed a preliminary response to the examiner’s
report.345 On April 4, 2012, DHI reached an agreement with nearly all its
creditors that shifted the CoalCo assets back to DHI, and provided unsecured
339
340
341

Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 136.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 139 (quoting Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 195
n.75 (Del. Ch. 2006)).
342 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
343 Dynegy Examiner Report, supra note 293, at 159.
344 Order Approving Settlement, at 7, In re Dynegy Holdings, L.L.C., No. 11-38111 (CGM)
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012).
345 Id.
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creditors with a 99% stake in the parent, Dynegy Inc., effectively wiping out
existing shareholders.346 On June 1, 2012, the bankruptcy court approved the
settlement.347 Finally, on September 5, 2012, the bankruptcy court approved
the plan of reorganization.348
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES: IS THE CURRENT
FRAMEWORK ADEQUATE?
In the preceding section, I surveyed the existing framework’s robust
resources for controlling shareholder–creditor conflicts in two key contexts.
As the variety of contractual and noncontractual measures shows, we already
have a wide variety of tools available. On the other hand, to the extent that
we have become a shareholder-centric system through changes in practice,
not changes in law, it is necessary to consider whether the law has kept pace,
as well as alternative approaches.
A. The Importance of Comparative Corporate Law:
The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom provides an important comparison to the United
States. Both have large numbers of widely held or “dispersed ownership”
corporations. Yet, although the economies are relatively similar, U.K.
corporate law is far more “shareholder-centric” than board-centric Delaware
corporate law. This can be illustrated by a variety of different provisions.
The core, fundamental decisionmaking body under U.K. law is the shareholders acting in the general meeting.349 U.K. shareholders have the power
to elect directors, and importantly, the power to remove directors, with or
without cause, before the expiration of their terms of office.350 This is
important because shareholders, without board acquiescence or special
provision in the articles of incorporation, additionally have the power to call
a general meeting.351 These provisions eliminate the entrenchment made
possible by staggered boards.352 Shareholders may force the company, at its

346
347
348

Joseph Checkler, Dynegy Reaches a Pact with Lenders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2012, at B3.
See generally Order Approving Settlement, supra note 344.
Joseph Checkler, Judge Confirms Dynegy’s Plan to Exit Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2012, at B9.
349 PAUL L. DAVIES & SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 435-499 (9th ed. 2012).
350 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 168 (Eng.).
351 Id. §§ 303–305.
352 John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—
The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1737 (2007).
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own expense, to circulate resolutions to be voted on at the annual general
meeting.353 In addition, shareholders enjoy mandatory preemption rights.354
The shareholder-centric character of U.K. law is particularly striking in the
control context. Under the Takeover Code, directors must remain largely
passive when a tender offer is made for the company’s shares and cannot
take any “frustrating action” without shareholder approval.355
U.K. law may be shareholder-centric, but it also imposes robust creditorregarding duties, primarily under the rubric of “wrongful trading.” 356
Section 214 imposes liability if “at some time before the commencement of
the winding up of the company, that person knew or ought to have concluded
that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going
into insolvent liquidation,” and did not take “every step with a view to
minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors as . . . he ought
to have taken.”357 My LBO hypothetical presents an easy case. The directors
knew that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency because
that is what the bankers told them, and they cannot claim that they took
every step with a view to minimizing the potential loss to creditors because,
in the hypothetical, they took none.358
With a knowledge standard of “knew or ought to have concluded” that is
interpreted according to the “objective” standard of a “reasonably diligent
person having both (a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may
reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as are
carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general
knowledge, skill and experience that that director has,”359 one can understand directors’ concerns with personal liability. On the other hand, and
important to understanding the balance struck, while directors face personal
353
354
355

Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338–340 (Eng.).
Id. § 561.
PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS,
Rule 21.1, at I13 (10th ed. 2011), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content
/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf; see also id. Gen. Principle 3, at B1. For background on this prohibition,
see Armour & Skeel, supra note 352, at 1773.
356 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214 (Eng.). For a concise but comprehensive overview of
directors’ creditor-regarding duties in the United Kingdom and on the continent, see Paul Davies,
Directors’ Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE
303 (Horst Eidenmüller & Wolfgang Schön, eds. 2008).
357 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(2)-(3) (Eng.).
358 See EILÍS FERRAN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 40-41 (2008) (discussing
the requirements of section 214); DAVID KERSHAW, COMPANY LAW IN CONTEXT: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 296-97 (2009) (discussing “shadow directors” in the context of section 214).
359 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 214(4) (Eng.).
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liability for wrongful trading, the court determines what contribution the
person shall make, if any, to the company’s assets. In addition, the wrongful
trading provision only applies in insolvent liquidation and not when there
are reorganizations through other procedures such as administrations,
schemes of arrangement, or workouts. 360 Because of a variety of other
differences between the United States and United Kingdom, the level of
enforcement is quite low.361 Even so, by all accounts, directors are very
conscious of the potential for wrongful-trading liability and the provision
has been criticized for potentially chilling entrepreneurial activity and
hurting creditors by inducing firms to cease trading prematurely in order to
avoid potential director liability.362
Yet, this legal and reputational risk can be managed. KKR and Blackstone have large London offices and private equity is alive and well in the
United Kingdom. How does the presence of a “wrongful trading” provision
with the potential for director liability affect the process and structure for
an LBO? Deals are said to be less leveraged than in the United States and,
prior to approving a transaction, target boards typically require a solvency
opinion from their bankers. 363 What makes the U.K. approach such an
interesting comparative case is that it shows how one recognizably similar
system has defined directors’ creditor-regarding duties, how deal lawyers
adjust, and how it potentially contributes to reducing extreme leverage—even
as differences in complementary institutions might make one reluctant to
transplant the United Kingdom’s “wrongful trading” provision to Delaware.
Comparative corporate law can also be useful in addressing the optimal
mix and development of tools: Is it better to broaden the restrictions on
distributions to shareholders or rely on the traditional view that directors
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation (rather than the shareholders

360 Horst Eidenmüller, Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, Workouts and
the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION, supra note 356, at 241, 251.
361 PAUL L. DAVIES WITH SARAH WORTHINGTON, GOWER & DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 223-24 (8th ed. 2008). The low level of enforcement has been
attributed to difficulties in financing wrongful-trading actions: liquidators, short on funds, are
apparently reluctant to spend money on any but the strongest cases; secured creditors are not
willing to finance cases because the law is clear that recoveries all go to benefit the unsecured
creditors; finally, the cause of action cannot be assigned to an entrepreneurial lawyer as doing so
would be “champertous” and thus illegal. Id.
362 See generally Re Cont’l Assurance Co. of London plc (in liquidation) (No. 4), [2001] 2
B.C.L.C. 287 (Ch.). For a review of the criticisms, see Davies, supra note 356, at 317-27.
363 Interview with William F. Charnley, Partner, King & Spalding L.L.P., in Oxford, Eng.
(June 7, 2011).
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directly)? This is a complicated question that has arisen in other corporate
law systems and that is beyond the scope of this Article.364
B. The Divided Architecture of U.S. Corporate Law and the
Specification of Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
A striking feature of the small set of Delaware cases dealing with the
duties of directors in or near bankruptcy is the fact that there are so few of
them. Directors’ creditor-regarding fiduciary duties are underspecified,
especially in comparison with the United Kingdom’s approach. This is
partly a result of the United States’ distinctive divided architecture of
corporate and insolvency law. Delaware courts adjudicate disputes in solvent
corporations, while bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over most insolvent
firms. Although many of the underlying rights enforced in bankruptcy are
determined by state law,365 the forum and procedures by which they are
enforced are a matter of federal bankruptcy law. This leads to a variety of
oddities and complexities.366
The United Kingdom, with its unitary, rather than divided judicial
architecture, offers an interesting comparison case. Unlike in the United
States, a single group of judges—the Chancery Division of the High
Court—hears both “Company Law” matters and insolvency cases, including
the winding up of companies.367

364 I owe this point to Assaf Hamdani, who argues that Israel, an economy characterized by
controlling shareholder structures, shows the value of expanding restrictions on distributions by,
for example, giving creditors the right to sue derivatively to enjoin distributions in solvent firms,
over relying on fiduciary duties.
365 See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why
such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a
bankruptcy proceeding.”).
366 David Skeel has written incisively on the division of labor between corporate law and
bankruptcy, and its effects, which he refers to as “vestigialization.” See generally David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1 (2009); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994). As
a bankruptcy specialist, he has primarily focused on how this division of labor has slowed the
development of bankruptcy doctrine (e.g., the development of state preference law, rules
governing derivative suits by creditors in bankruptcy, and corporate voting in bankrupt corporations). As he points out, when all insolvent firms end up in bankruptcy court, there is little
incentive for states to keep their state law insolvency procedures up to date, or to pay much
attention to doctrines that govern issues that arise exclusively in bankruptcy. This section
continues that inquiry, but with a corporate lawyer’s focus on directors’ duties.
367 Compare Company Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1156 (Eng.) (defining “the court”), and Insolvency Act,
1986, c. 45, § 117 (Eng.) (granting the court jurisdiction to wind up companies), with CHANCERY
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The U.S. architecture has dramatically influenced the development of
the common law of corporations.368 First, the different courts understand
their roles differently. Bankruptcy is, fundamentally, about restructuring
debtor–creditor relations, and not about the adjudication of state-created
rights and duties.369 This core function sets the tasks of the bankruptcy
court and bankruptcy practitioners, which include the following: staying
collection efforts; sorting out creditors’ claims; designing plans of reorganization (in the case of Chapter 11); and moving forward with dispatch. State
law fiduciary duty claims against directors (who are not parties to the
bankruptcy) can enter this process as part of maximizing the assets of the
debtor’s estate, but, with the important goal of quick resolution and exit,
they will necessarily be treated as secondary concerns. The tasks of Delaware Chancery Courts and the Supreme Court are entirely different.
Although accustomed to deciding matters quickly in order to allow transactions to proceed, a key part of the Delaware courts’ mission is to define and
articulate the duties of directors.
These differing institutional roles combine with the divided architecture
to create selection bias. Delaware courts focus primarily on the rights of
shareholders and bondholders in solvent corporations because those are the
main types of cases they see. Bankruptcy courts primarily focus on unsecured versus secured creditor issues in insolvent corporations because those
are the cases they see. Directors’ creditor-regarding duties—prominent in
unitary systems like the United Kingdom—fall between the two poles.
Second, bankruptcy courts, like federal district courts sitting in diversity,
are limited in their ability to develop corporate law’s creditor-protection
features systematically because these are part of Delaware corporate law, not
federal bankruptcy law. As in other situations when a court applies nonforum law, anything a bankruptcy court or a district court says about
Delaware corporate law is essentially a guess about how the Delaware
Supreme Court would decide. By contrast, when a bankruptcy court applies

GUIDE 2013, ch. 20, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-and-tribunals/courts/
chancery-division (treating proceedings under the Chancery Division).
368 It is important to realize the large extent to which Delaware corporate law is common
law. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1591-97 (2005). See generally Rock, supra note 176.
369 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J.)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he restructuring of debtor–creditor relations, which is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private
rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case.”).
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the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer jurisprudence, it is applying
bankruptcy law.370
Finally, and most importantly, a unitary system keeps both shareholder
and creditor issues in front of the same set of judges. When judges have
cases raising both types of issues, they are more likely to focus on the
conflict between shareholder and creditors interests, especially at the
solvent–insolvent boundary.
Delaware courts have the expertise but not the cases. Bankruptcy courts
have the cases but do not have the necessary corporate law expertise, time,
or incentives. Amending the Delaware constitution to permit bankruptcy
courts to certify questions to the Delaware Supreme Court would provide
some useful insight.371 This sensible change has the potential to increase the
flow of cases, but it is not clear by how much. Because certification interrupts the flow of the case, bankruptcy judges can be expected to use it
sparingly, instead relying on the parties to brief the issues and then deciding
the issue themselves. In addition, answers provided on a necessarily incomplete record may be of uncertain value. Without the benefit of a full factual
record, the Delaware Supreme Court is less able to engage in the common
law-making process as it considers how Delaware law should evolve in the
face of changing conditions. Finally, bankruptcy has some compensating
institutions which make appeal to Delaware less pressing. In particular, the
power to appoint an expert examiner to analyze potential claims and
provide advice to the court is extremely valuable. As the Dynegy case
shows, an able examiner, with expertise in both bankruptcy law and Delaware law, can help bankruptcy judges bridge the two systems.
C. Delaware’s Role as Impartial Umpire
Delaware’s preeminence as a corporate law jurisdiction is explained in
part by the excellence of its courts in adjudicating conflicts. Delaware’s fans
370 In a unitary system such as the United Kingdom’s, with the same judges hearing corporate
law and insolvency matters, there will be a much more continuous development in both corporate and
insolvency law. Insolvency focuses the mind wonderfully and raises core corporate law duty issues in a
context in which breaches arguably caused real harm. Strikingly, a significant number of important
U.K. company law cases are insolvency cases. See, e.g., Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1896] A.C. 22
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (corporation as legal person); Re Bluebrook Ltd, [2009] EWHC
(Ch) 2114, [2010] 1 B.C.L.C. 338 (Ch.) (related party transactions and valuation); Regentcrest plc (in
liquidation) v. Cohen, [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 80 (Ch.) (good faith duty); Re D’Jan of London Ltd., [1993]
B.C.C. 646 (Ch.) (duty of care); In re City Equitable Fire Ins. Co., [1924] 1 Ch. 407 (director fraud).
371 See generally Henry duPont Ridgely, Avoiding the Thickets of Guesswork: The Delaware
Supreme Court and Certified Questions of Corporation Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 1127 (2010).
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(including me) believe that incorporation in Delaware benefits shareholders
because its law and courts do better than any alternative jurisdiction in
striking the balance between shareholders and managers, and between
controlling and noncontrolling shareholders. Does Delaware do as good a
job policing shareholder–creditor conflicts? There may be reason for
concern.
There is an intriguing strand of finance research that purports to identify
a link among legal rules protecting creditors, capital structure, and market
valuation. John Wald and Michael Long report that U.S. manufacturing
firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less
debt.372 Yaxuan Qi and Wald find that firms incorporated in states with
stronger payout restrictions are less likely to include creditor-protective
debt covenants that constrain payouts, limit additional debt, or restrict the
sale of assets.373 Sattar Mansi, William Maxwell, and Wald find that firms
incorporated in states with more restrictive payout rules have better credit
ratings and significantly lower yield spreads than firms incorporated in less
restrictive states.374
These studies are flawed because there are no significant differences in
restrictions on distributions to shareholders in different states.375 But that
372 John K. Wald & Michael S. Long, The Effect of State Laws on Capital Structure, 83 J. FIN.
ECON. 297, 315-16 (2007).
373 Yaxuan Qi & John Wald, State Laws and Debt Covenants, 51 J.L. & ECON. 179, 203 (2008).
374 Sattar A. Mansi, William F. Maxwell & John K. Wald, Creditor Protection Laws and the
Cost of Debt, 52 J.L. & ECON. 701, 716-18 & n.31 (2009).
375 For the basics of stock repurchase and dividend regulation, see supra subsection IV.A.2. In
these studies, the authors take the “minimum asset-to-debt” ratio for a distribution as the measure
of the stringency of the state law restrictions on distributions. See, e.g., Mansi, Maxwell & Wald,
supra note 374, at 707. These studies find that in Delaware this constraint equals 0, in New York it
equals 1, and in California it equals 1.25 (Delaware, New York, and California are the three main
jurisdictions and drive all the results). Id. The most significant finding is that creditors have
greater confidence in firms incorporated in New York or California, with robust limitations on
distributions to shareholders, than those incorporated in Delaware, with no significant restrictions.
Id. at 721. But, contrary to the authors’ assertions, there is little interstate variation in the legal
rules restricting distributions to shareholders, even though there are some differences in statutory
language.
As noted above, one traditional limitation on the source of distributions is that they must be
out of “surplus”—a term of art meaning the value of the firm’s assets exceeds its liabilities plus
some cushion, a type of “balance sheet solvency” test. The only difference between states is their
definition of the “cushion”: Delaware and New York use the traditional “stated capital” approach,
in which the cushion is the aggregate “par value” plus additional amounts designated by the board
of directors. BLACK, supra note 179, §§ 2:23 (Delaware), 2:33 (New York). California substituted
the reliance on par value with a mandatory 25% cushion, with a variety of subrules for what is
included in the calculation of assets and liabilities. Id. § 3:12. States that follow the Model Business
Corporation Act likewise dispense with par value, but do not include the 25% cushion (a position
that California adopted in 2011). Id. §§ 3:1–3:8. There is no reason to think that aggregate par
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only makes the studies more interesting: they have found statistically
significant differences among states, with creditors apparently preferring
New York and California over Delaware. Indeed, it seems that U.S. manufacturing firms incorporated outside of Delaware are less leveraged; are less
likely to include creditor-protective debt covenants that constrain payouts,
limit additional debt, or restrict the sale of assets; and have better credit
ratings and significantly lower yield spreads.
This “Delaware effect” seems to be real. What could be causing it, if it is
not a result of different legal rules on distributions to shareholders? One
possible interpretation of the results is that creditors view Delaware courts
as “equity courts” in which equity holders (i.e., shareholders) systemically
do better than creditors.
This is consistent with other findings. Ted Eisenberg and Geoff Miller
argue that New York is to contracting what Delaware is to incorporation:
the preferred choice of discerning consumers. Using a large sample of
corporate contracts, Eisenberg and Miller show that New York law is the
overwhelming choice of law for financing contracts, and for other types of
major business contracts as well.376 Moreover, New York is the designated
forum in 41% of contracts with a forum selection clause, with Delaware
designated in only 11% of such contracts.377
New York’s success in attracting major corporate contracts is not accidental. According to Eisenberg and Miller, New York competes for major
commercial contracts in much the same way as Delaware competes for

value in Delaware or New York corporations is systematically higher or lower than California’s 25%
cushion, as applied.
The real difference among state statutes, not mentioned in the finance studies, is the presence
of an “equity solvency” limitation. California, New York, and states following the Model Business
Corporation Act all include a provision prohibiting distributions if, as the Model Business Code
states, “after giving [the distribution] effect: (1) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts
as they become due in the usual course of business.” MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 6.40(c) (2008);
see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1990); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 2003).
Although the Delaware code does not contain any such provision, it was long ago adopted by case
law. See, e.g., SV Inv. Partners v. ThoughtWorks, Inc., 7 A.3d 973, 987 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff ’d, 37
A.3d 205 (Del. 2011). In addition, state and federal fraudulent conveyance rules contain overlapping restrictions (albeit without director liability).
It is thus hard to identify any actual difference in the restrictions imposed on boards of directors
in paying dividends or repurchasing stock. As far as I can tell, lawyers advising boards of directors on
distributions to shareholders do not give different advice based on state of incorporation.
376 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of
Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1475, 1489 (2009).
377 Id. at 1504 tbl.11.
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corporations, namely, by offering “a menu of substantive rules that are
desired by the contracting parties and by providing prompt, efficient, and
reliable procedures and institutions for resolving disputes.”378
Finally, these findings are consistent with the politics of Delaware corporate law. Casual empiricism suggests that corporate law in Delaware,
while influenced by shareholder interests and managerial interests, does not
have an equally well-organized creditor lobby.379 This contrasts with New
York, where creditor interests are well-organized and active in ensuring that
New York remains a center for commercial law.380
Should Delaware be concerned that investors believe it favors equity over
debt? Perhaps Delaware should worry, if inadequate creditor protection raises
a firm’s cost of capital and thereby affects the desirability of Delaware law.
D. Our “Model” of the Corporation
Two ways of thinking about corporations (what in some contexts are
called “models”) coexist somewhat uneasily within corporate law: the
“entity” model, which views the corporation as a social institution; and the
“property” (or even “contract”) model, which views the corporation as
nothing more than the property of its shareholders. 381 Each can claim
preeminence in different eras, with the property model dominant in the
19th century, the entity model emerging with the rise of managerialism in
the 1930s, and the property model reemerging during the 1980s.382 Each

378 Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
2073, 2073-74 (2009); see also THE CHIEF JUDGE’S TASK FORCE ON COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN
THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK 9-14 (2012), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/comdiv/PDFs/Chief
JudgesTaskForceOnCommercialLitigationInThe21stpdf.pdf (recommending improvements to retain
New York’s status as “an attractive forum for commercial litigation”).
379 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 680 (2005) (“[C]orporation law in
Delaware is influenced by only the two constituencies whose views are most important in
determining where entities incorporate: managers and stockholders . . . [I]t is . . . fair to say
that both groups have a lot of clout, and that Delaware corporate lawmakers seriously consider
each group's perspective on all key issues.”).
380 See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 376, at 1492 (noting that New York’s dominant role in
finance contracts “likely is reinforced by the location of large banks in New York”).
381 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 266-72 (1992). In a very interesting recent article, Justice Jack Jacobs has pointed out
the misalignment between the current model implicit in Delaware case law—that of passive,
helpless, and ignorant shareholders—and the reality of concentrated shareholders. See Jack B.
Jacobs, Does the New Corporate Shareholder Profile Call for a New Corporate Law Paradigm?, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 21 (2012).
382 See generally Allen, supra note 381.
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finds support in features of Delaware law.383 Somewhat counterintuitively,
the more the reality becomes shareholder-centric and descriptively conforms to the “property” model, the more important the “entity” view of the
corporation becomes for law and practice, especially when the business
judgment rule and exculpation provisions protect directors from liability.
These sorts of “models” can be both positive and normative. When used
prescriptively, the basic understanding of the corporation orients fiduciaries
in the performance of their duties and courts in the review of that performance. For example, an entity view of the corporation is important for
compensation committees as they consider how to structure compensation:
it reminds them that the goal of the exercise is to create valuable firms.
The entity view is more broadly important in orienting managers and
directors, serving as a counterweight to their self-interests. When managers
owned little or no stock in their firms, requiring them to manage for the
entity’s benefit reinforced their tendencies to confuse self-interest with
duty-fulfillment. The great virtue of Jensen and Meckling’s deflationary and
reductionist “nexus of contracting” view was that it put pressure on the
managerialist model that had provided a cover story for management
entrenchment. Exhorting fiduciaries to maximize shareholder value, by
contrast, pushed them to look beyond their interest in keeping their jobs to
the interests of the shareholders, whose interests (unlike creditors’) were
not already aligned with their own.
The problem is that when managers start to think like shareholders, a
normative model that enjoins fiduciaries to focus exclusively or predominantly on shareholder interests will only reinforce their self-interested
tendencies. When the key questions involve conflicts among the various
stakeholders in the firm—shareholders versus creditors and controlling versus
noncontrolling shareholders—a different normative model is required.
In these circumstances, the entity view becomes critically important, not
because a corporation is “really”—from some metaphysical or conceptual
perspective—an entity rather than an aggregate, but for normative and
instrumental reasons. When key conflicts exist between controlling and
noncontrolling shareholders, the entity view, by encouraging the board to
serve the interests of the corporate entity rather than the controlling
383 For example, the rules governing standing in derivative suits emerge out of the “entity”
conception of the corporation, a conception in which fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation
itself. By contrast, doctrines like Revlon “duties” are more consistent with a model that views the
corporation as nothing more than a network or nexus of contracts with fiduciary duties owed to
the shareholders.
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shareholder, provides useful guidance and a valuable counterweight. Likewise, when key conflicts exist between equity and debt, and when managers
have robust equity incentives, enjoining the board to serve the interests of
the corporate entity rather than equity will provide useful counterbalancing
pressures that challenge the human tendency to confuse self-interest with
right conduct.
CONCLUSION
The world has changed. The old picture of the managerial corporation
in which managers, compensated like bureaucrats, entrench themselves at
the expense of helpless and passive shareholders is dead and should be
buried. Managers now largely think and act like shareholders.
In thinking about disputes among participants in the corporation, we
should stop assuming that there is a significant divergence of interests
between passive shareholders and entrenching managers. Given the changes
in the world, it would be more plausible to assume that managers think like
shareholders, for better and for worse. But, more to the point, there is no
reason to assume anything: it is easy enough to prove what managers’ actual
incentives are. The relevant information is all disclosed.
When managers’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests, a
misalignment opens up between shareholder–manager interests on the one
side and creditor interests on the other. When this happens, creditors might
plausibly claim that shareholders and managers are seeking to transfer value
from creditors in a way that impairs firm value. It is, of course, a separate
matter whether the attempt infringes on any legally cognizable creditor
interests. But, when interpreting creditor–firm contracts, applying traditional,
legal limitations on distributions to shareholders, and analyzing new situations that arise, courts would do well to be on the lookout for opportunistic
behavior.
We should remember that “shareholder value maximization” is only a tool
for building valuable companies and a rich society. Like any tool, it can be
overused. As shown above, the law contains a variety of legal tools to temper
the focus on equity value—to introduce “cooling rods” into the “reactor core”
to prevent meltdown. Having lived through the financial meltdown of 2008,
we should all be a bit more cautious about strategies that increase risk or
depend on an assumption that bankruptcy costs are trivial. Paying attention
to creditors can be a useful proxy for the universe of nonshareholder interests.
Ultimately, I am arguing less for changing the law than for changing the
conversation. Rather than yet another permutation of old shareholderversus-manager debates, we should look around at what the actual conflicts
are and consider what to do about them.

